Trimming

Harvard Law Review

Volumn 122, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 1049-1094

  Sunstein, Cass R ^a  

^a HARVARD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

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EID: 61849159852     PISSN: 0017811X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (195)

1. LORD HALIFAX, THE CHARACTER OF A TRIMMER (London 1688), in 1 THE WORKS OF GEORGE SAVILE MARQUIS OF HALIFAX 178, 179, 243 (Mark N. Brown ed., 1989) (footnote omitted).
2. John D. Sinclair, Note on Canto III, in I THE DIVINE COMEDY OF DANTE ALIGHIERI: INFERNO 54, 54-55 (John D. Sinclair trans., 1961).
3. Although neither Dante nor Sinclair used the word "trimmers," the '"neutrals' . . . have been retroactively called trimmers." Eugene Goodheart, In Defense of Trimming, 25 PHIL. & LITERATURE 46, 46 (2001).
4. I am assuming here that the law of libel is a product of some kind of democratic judgment, either through state statutes or through implicit acceptance of common law decisions.
5. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES (2006);
6. ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY (2006). Note that the distinctions among the three approaches cut across familiar debates about the sources of constitutional meaning. For example, originalists embrace rights fundamentalism in some domains while embracing democratic primacy in other domains, depending on what the original meaning requires.
7. In fact the Court's approach in its seminal decision on libel law roughly tracked the fourth approach. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
8. Discussion of overlapping issues can be found, however, in J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Rehnquist Court at Twilight: The Lures and Perils of Split-the-Dijference Jurisprudence, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1969 (2006).
9. For historical treatments, see H.C. FOXCROFT, A CHARACTER OF THE TRIMMER: BEING A SHORT LIFE OF THE FIRST MARQUIS OF HALIFAX (1946);
10. HENRY HORWITZ, PARLIAMENT, POLICY AND POLITICS IN THE REIGN OF WILLIAM III (1977);
11. Donald R. Benson, Halifax and the Trimmers, 27 HUNTINGTON LIBRARY Q. 115 (1964);
12. Mark N. Brown, Trimmers and Moderates in the Reign of Charles II, 37 HUNTINGTON LIBRARY Q. 311 (1974);
13. Thomas C. Faulkner, Halifax's The Character of a Trimmer and L'Estrange's Attack on Trimmers in The Observator, 37 HUNTINGTON LIBRARY Q. 71 (1973).
14. For a valuable discussion, see Goodheart, supra note 2.
15. Goodheart, supra note 2, at 48-49.
16. See id.
17. For a related discussion, with a skeptical conclusion, see Wilkinson, supra note 6. Trimming can be understood as a form of "split-the-difference jurisprudence," but as we shall see, the arguments on its behalf are more appealing than the term suggests.
18. See Goodheart, supra note 2, at 54.
19. Benson, supra note 7, at 118.
20. Id. at 131-32.
21. HALIFAX, supra note I.
22. Faulkner, supra note 7, at 73.
23. FOXCROFT, supra note 7, at 336.
24. Tim Harris, What's New About the Restoration?, 29 ALBİON 187, 211 (1997).
25. See id. at 211-12.
26. Faulkner, supra note 7, at 76
27. (quoting OBSERVATOŘ, Dec. 3, 1684).
28. Id.
29. (quoting OBSERVATOR, Nov. 16, 1682).
30. Harris, supra note 17, at 212 (citing THE CHARACTER OF A CHURCH-TRIMMER (London 1683)).
31. Id. at 211-12 (discussing L'Estrange's attacks on Trimmers).
32. PHILLIP HARTH, PEN FOR A PARTY: DRYDEN'S TORY PROPAGANDA IN ITS CONTEXTS 210 (1993) (emphasis omitted)
33. (quoting JOHN DRYDEN, VINDICATION OF THE DUKE OF GUISE (London 1683),
34. reprinted in 7 THE WORKS OF JOHN DRYDEN 135, 182 (Sir Walter Scott ed., rev. ed., Edinburgh, William Paterson 1883)).
35. Benson, supra note 7, at 116
36. (quoting II THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 365 (1st ed. 1933));
37. see also II THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 365 (Ist ed. 1933) (collecting additional historical uses of the word in this sense).
38. Benson, supra note 7, at 132.
39. Id. at 134.
40. Brown, supra note 7, at 319.
41. Id. at 328-30.
42. HALIFAX, supra note I, at 243.
43. See id. at 184-99.
44. Id. at 240.
45. See id. at 194-95.
46. Id. at 184-99.
47. Id. at 180.
48. Id. at 222.
49. Id.
50. See Mark N. Brown, Introduction to 1 THE WORKS OF GEORGE SAVILE MARQUIS OF HALIFAX, supra note 1, at 3, III.
51. HORWITZ, supra note 7, at 35
52. (quoting 2 H.C. FOXCROFT, THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF SIR GEORGE SAVILE, BART. FIRST MARQUIS OF HALIFAX 230, 229 (London, Longmans, Green and Co. 1898)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
53. I THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND 185 (Folio Press 1985) (1848).
54. Id. at 185-86.
55. See Wilkinson, supra note 6, at 1971 (describing the late Rehnquist Court in the following way: "[T]he Court sought to tackle the most controversial issues before it by splitting the difference. Few courts have ever raised this form of jurisprudence to such an art form.").
56. The choice between the emphases will depend on why a trimmer trims. See infra Part III (stressing that trimming might produce the best result in principle (a point that suggests that trimmers must make independent judgments) and also the possibility that trimming will moderate social conflict (a point that suggests that trimmers should attend to the positions that are most deeply felt)).
57. I am grateful to Richard Fallon for pressing this distinction.
58. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 518 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
59. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 781 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
60. See, e.g., Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 482 (1995);
61. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-73 & n.24.
62. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
63. Cf. DWORKIN, supra note 4 (examining the various ways in which law and morals are interwoven and how a judge's moral convictions bear on her judgments about what constitutes law).
64. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Of course, a rejection of substantive due process might be based on multiple grounds, including textual and historical ones.
65. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 588 (Scalia, J., dissenting);
66. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. no, 122-30 (1989) (plurality opinion).
67. For an intriguing example of an outcome that reflects compromising, in part because of internal disagreement, see United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
68. In that case, the Court found that certain judicial uses of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment, id. at 226-27,
69. but that the proper remedy was not to do away with the guidelines, but to use them in an advisory capacity, id. at 245.
70. The Court as a whole ended up trimming, with five Justices supporting invalidation, with four of these supporting reduced use of the guidelines - and with five supporting continued use of the guidelines, with four of these supporting validation. See Wilkinson, supra note 6, at 1975.
71. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 23-59 (1976).
72. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895, 901 (1992). To the extent that the undue burden standard is left open, it combines trimming (rejecting the poles) with a form of minimalism (leaving key issues undecided).
73. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976).
74. For suggestions that this approach is a kind of compromise, see Collin O'Connor Udell, Note, Signaling a New Direction in Gender Classification Scrutiny: United States v. Virginia, 29 CONN. L. REV. 521, 527-28 (1996),
75. and Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Barbara Flagg, Some Reflections on the Feminist Thoughts of the 1970s, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 9, 17.
76. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
77. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 691-92 (2005).
78. Cf. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26, 45. I do not mean to suggest that this view is correct.
79. On some issues, District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008), adopts what might be seen as a form of originalist trimming.
80. See id. at 2799 (suggesting limits on the Second Amendment right).
81. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW (2002).
82. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489-90 (1955). Of course it is true that if the "rational basis" standard means that all legislation will be upheld, it is not a form of trimming.
83. For some intermediate positions, see New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
84. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318-20 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.).
85. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003);
86. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
87. Cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976).
88. See id.
89. As controversial but possible examples, see Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 482-83 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring),
90. and Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
91. See Duncan Kennedy, Strategizing Strategic Behavior in Legal Interpretation, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 785, 795-96 (discussing difference splitting).
92. See Itamar Simonson & Amos Tversky, Choice in Context: Tradeoff Contrast and Extremeness Aversion, 29 J. MARKETING RES. 281 (1992);
93. see also Mark Kelman et al., Context-Dependence in Legal Decision Making, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 287 (1996) (discussing the desirability of options that are seen as compromises).
94. Kelman et al., supra note 68, at 288.
95. Id. at 291-92.
96. For some theoretical reasons to think that trimmers might be right on this count, see SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE (2007).
97. See JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS (2004).
98. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA 50 (2006).
99. See id.
100. On this point, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS (forthcoming 2009).
101. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 311 (2003);
102. see also Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
103. I am putting to one side the interesting situations in which internal divisions in the Court produce a trimming solution favored by only one or two members. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005);
104. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319-20 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.). Many multimember institutions occasionally trim not because a majority favors trimming, but because large groups are divided and a middle position, favored only by a minority, turns out to prevail.
105. This approach might be distinguished from other forms of strategic compromise, such as the idea that judges might strategically negotiate for votes in a way that moderates opinions. See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 69-70 (1998);
106. Frank B. Cross, The Justices of Strategy, 48 DUKE L.J. 511, 522-24 (1998)
107. (reviewing EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra).
108. For a superb discussion of invisible hand mechanisms, see Edna Ullmann-Margalit, The Invisible Hand and the Cunning of Reason, 64 SOC. RES. 181 (1997).
109. For examples of these mechanisms at work in the Court, see supra note 77.
110. See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., 544 U.S. 528 (2005);
111. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002);
112. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
113. See Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?, 60 STAN. L. REV. 155, 159 (2007).
114. See id.
115. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH III-33 (1962).
116. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME 3-6 (1999).
117. See infra section III. F for some explanatory comments on this point.
118. Sinclair, supra note 2, at 55.
119. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 149, 150-51 (2006).
120. For a number of discussions, see the papers available at the Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law School, at http://culturalcognition.net.
121. See, e.g., Kahan & Braman, supra note 87, at 158-60.
122. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In suggesting the Court did not trim, I mean to say that the Court explicitly rejected the idea of "separate but equal" in education (and eventually elsewhere).
123. See GERD GIGERENZER, GUT FEELINGS 217-19 (2007) (discussing the decisionmaking heuristic of doing as the majority does).
124. See Wilkinson, supra note 6, at 1984.
125. See the skeptical remarks of Judge Wilkinson, id. at 1989-91, suggesting that efforts to split the difference lead to results that do not properly interpret the founding document.
126. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 37-41 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
127. Thus, for example, District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008), perhaps the most self-consciously originalist opinion in the Court's history, is not fundamentally a form of trimming.
128. See, e.g., VERMEULE, supra note 4, at 230.
129. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 59, at 2-4.
130. Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955), with its "all deliberate speed" formula, can easily be understood as a form of trimming, one that recognized both practical realities and intensely felt beliefs on all sides. But it is not at all clear that the Court's approach was defensible for that reason.
131. See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46 WASH. L. REV. 3, 22 (1970).
132. See Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
133. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
134. Cf. Robert F. Kennedy, Foreword to the Memorial Edition of JOHN F. KENNEDY, PROFILES IN COURAGE, at xi, xiii (memorial ed. 1964) ("President Kennedy was fond of quoting Dante that 'the hottest places in Hell are reserved for those who, in a time of great moral crisis, maintain their neutrality.'").
135. The quotation is illuminating but not accurate; see the second epigraph, supra p. 1052. The objection to trimming is most obviously correct when the trimmer produces an arbitrary or random result, as in the view that, for example, commercial advertising is protected on Monday-Wednesday, but not on Thursday-Saturday, and on the basis of a coin-flip on Sunday. No sensible trimmer, whether compromiser or preserver, acts in this random fashion, but the risk of error extends well beyond randomness. (I do not mean to say anything here about legitimate controversies involving the uses of randomization.)
136. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301.
137. Robert E. Goodin, Possessive Individualism Again, 24 POL. STUD. 488, 489 (1976).
138. See Kelman et al., supra note 68, at 288.
139. See id. at 290-95 (showing that experimental jurors' choice of penalty varied in accordance with the options presented).
140. See Adrian Vermeule, Emergency Lawmaking After 9/11 and 7/7, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1155, 1182 (2008).
141. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 75.
142. Wilkinson, supra note 6, at 1991.
143. See John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723 (1974);
144. Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753 (1985).
145. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816 (2008) ("We conclude that nothing in our precedents forecloses our adoption of the original understanding of the Second Amendment.").
146. See VERMEULE, supra note 4, at 1.
147. See Goodheart, supra note 2, at 49.
148. Judge Wilkinson seems to elide the distinction between the two groups with his exploration of "splitting differences." For example, he suggests that "[s]plitting the difference thus enabled the Rehnquist Court in its final years to craft narrow rulings . . . ." Wilkinson, supra note 6, at 1982.
149. The word "narrow" suggests a focus on particulars, or a case-by-case approach, see id., of the sort endorsed by minimalists; trimmers prefer width.
150. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 66-68 (1999) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
151. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1035 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment);
152. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 579-81 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
153. I discuss minimalism at length in CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME (1999).
154. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1735-38 (1995).
155. John G. Roberts Jr., Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Commencement Address at the Georgetown University Law Center (May 21, 2006), in GEORGETOWN L., Fall/Winter 2006, at 19, 22.
156. Id.
157. The minimalist features of District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008), might be defended in this way.
158. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 59, at 2-12.
159. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 133-68 (1996).
160. See Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 356 (2006).
161. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178-80 (1989).
162. See VERMEULE, supra note 4, at 230-88 (arguing for judicial deference).
163. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315-19 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.).
164. For valuable discussion, see Christopher J. Peters, Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1454 (2000).
165. See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992);
166. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992);
167. Cass R. Sunstein, Problems With Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953 (1995).
168. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874-79 (1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
169. See Scalia, supra note 124.
170. See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
171. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 44-46.
172. See supra p. 1062.
173. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
174. In fact the Court's initial decision on the topic, see id., combines a measure of trimming with considerable minimalism.
175. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 2007 Term-Comment: Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller As Griswold, 122 HARV. L. REV. 246, 267-69 (2008).
176. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 857-916 (5th ed. 2005).
177. See id. at 576-622.
178. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980);
179. see also Cass R. Sunstein, Public Deliberation, Affirmative Action, and the Supreme Court, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1179, 1185-87 (1996).
180. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003);
181. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
182. See DWORKIN supra note 4, at 69.
183. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531-34 (1996).
184. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730-32 (1963);
185. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955).
186. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 142.
187. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907-12 (1982);
188. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
189. Through the middle of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court took the view that the benefits of political speech should be weighed against its costs discounted by their improbability. This balancing approach was taken in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951);
190. it is defended in Richard A. Posner, The Speech Market and the Legacy of Schenck, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT 121 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002).
191. For a defense of the current approach, which rejects balancing, see Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449 (1985). We could imagine situations in which societies faced grave risks of violence, in which the Brandenburg test would have to be rethought, and in which a form of trimming would come to have appeal.
192. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS 385-442 (2004).
193. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 425 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
194. During the New Deal period, for example, trimming had little appeal, and new institutions were designed to ensure significant movements. For a statement that captures much of the thinking of the era, see JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938).
195. Both originalists and moral readers might, of course, endorse trimming within their preferred method -as, for example, when originalists choose to compromise between originalist positions, or to preserve what is most plausible in competing originalist positions.