Outside options: Another reason to choose the first-price auction

European Economic Review

Volumn 53, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 153-169

  Kirchkamp, Oliver ^a   Poen, Eva ^b   Reiß, J Philipp ^c  

^a FRIEDRICH SCHILLER UNIVERSITY JENA   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

^c MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Auction; Experiments; First price auction; Outside options; Overbidding; Revenue premium; Second price auction; Strategy method

Indexed keywords

COMMODITY MARKET; COMMODITY PRICE; ECONOMICS; MODELING;

EID: 61649120592     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2008.03.005     Document Type: Article

References (24)

1. Ashenfelter O.C., and Graddy K. Auctions and the price of art. Journal of Economic Literature 41 3 (2003) 763-787
2. Brosig J., and Reiß J.P. Entry decisions and bidding behavior in sequential first-price procurement auctions: An experimental study. Games and Economic Behavior 58 1 (2007) 50-74
3. Cherry T., Frykblom P., Shogren J., List J., and Sullivan M. Laboratory testbeds and non-market valuation: The case of bidding behavior in a second-price auction with an outside option. Environmental and Resource Economics 29 3 (2004) 285-294
4. Cox J.C., Roberson B., and Smith V.L. Theory and behavior of single object auctions. Research in Experimental Economics 2 (1982) 1-43
5. Fischbacher U. z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Experimental Economics 10 2 (2007) 171-178
6. Gale I.L., and Hausch D.B. Bottom-fishing and declining prices in sequential auctions. Games and Economic Behavior 7 (1994) 318-331
7. Güth W., and Ivanova-Stenzel R. Asymmetric auction experiments with(out) commonly known beliefs. Economic Letters 80 (2003) 195-199
8. Güth W., Ivanova-Stenzel R., Königstein M., and Strobel M. Bid functions in auctions and fair division games: Experimental evidence. German Economic Review 3 4 (2002) 461-484
9. Güth W., Ivanova-Stenzel R., Königstein M., and Strobel M. Learning to bid-An experimental study of bid function adjustments in auctions and fair division games. Economic Journal 113 (2003) 477-494
10. Holt C.A. Competitive bidding for contracts under alternative auction procedures. Journal of Political Economy 88 3 (1980) 433-445
11. Isaac R.M., and James D. Just who are you calling risk averse?. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 20 2 (2000) 177-187
12. Kagel J.H., and Levin D. Independent private values auctions: Bidder behavior in first-, second-, and third-price auctions with varying numbers of bidders. Economic Journal 103 (1993) 868-879
13. Kagel J.H., Harstad R.M., and Levin D. Information impact and allocation rules in auctions with affiliated private values: A laboratory study. Econometrica 55 (1987) 1275-1304
14. Keser C., and Olson M. Experimental examination of the declining price anomaly. In: Ginsburgh V., and Menger P.-M. (Eds). Economics of the Arts: Selected Essays (1996), North-Holland, Amsterdam 151-175
15. Kirchkamp, O., Reiß, J.P., Sadrieh A., 2006. A pure variation of risk in first-price auctions. METEOR Research Memorandum No. 058, Maastricht University.
16. Myerson R.B. Optimal auction design. Mathematics of Operations Research 6 1 (1981) 58-73
17. Ockenfels A., and Selten R. Impulse balance equilibrium and feedback in first price auctions. Games and Economic Behavior 51 (2005) 155-170
18. Pezanis-Christou, P., Sadrieh, A., 2004. Elicited bid functions in (a)symmetric first-price auctions, Working paper.
19. Reiß, J.P., Schöndube, J.R., 2007. First-price equilibrium and revenue equivalence in a sequential procurement auction model. METEOR Research Memorandum No. 07/003, Maastricht University.
20. Riley J.G., and Samuelson W.F. Optimal auctions. American Economic Review 71 3 (1981) 381-392
21. Rogers W.H. Regression standard errors in clustered samples. Stata Technical Bulletin 13 (1993) 19-23 Reprinted in Stata Technical Bulletin Reprints 3, 88-94
22. Selten R., and Buchta J. Bidding behavior in first-price auctions with directly observed bid functions. In: Budescu D., Erev E., and Zwick R. (Eds). Games and Human Behavior: Essays in the Honors of Amnon Rapoport (1999), Lawrenz Associates, Mahwah, NJ 79-102
23. Vickrey W. Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance 16 (1961) 8-37
24. Weber R.J. Multiple-object auctions. In: Engelbrecht-Wiggans R., Shubik M., and Stark R.M. (Eds). Auctions, Bidding, and Contracting: Uses and Theory (1983), New York University Press, New York 165-191