Asymmetric auction experiments with(out) commonly known beliefs

Economics Letters

Volumn 80, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 195-199

  Güth, Werner ^a   Ivanova Stenzel, Radosveta ^b  

^a Max Planck Institute for Geoanthropology   (Germany)

^b HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Asymmetric sealed bid auctions; Beliefs; Experiments

Indexed keywords

EID: 30244564188     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-1765(03)00098-3     Document Type: Article

References (11)

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