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Volumn 6, Issue 5, 2004, Pages 707-735

Politically determined income inequality and the provision of public goods

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EID: 61549110703     PISSN: 10973923     EISSN: 14679779     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2004.00188.x     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (11)

References (17)
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  • 2
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    • The breakup of nations: A political economy analysis
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  • 7
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    • Cartels that vote: Agricultural marketing boards and induced voting behavior, in
    • E. E. Bailey, Ed. MIT Press: Cambridge, MA
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    • (1987) Public Regulation: New Perspectives on Institutions and Policies
    • Cave, J.1    Salant, S.W.2
  • 9
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    • Equilibrium existence and uniqueness in public good models: An elementary proof via contraction
    • CORNES, R., R. HARTLEY, and T. SANDLER (1999) Equilibrium existence and uniqueness in public good models: An elementary proof via contraction, Journal of Public Economic Theory 1, 499-509
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    • Resource allocation and the public sector
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    • 0031578589 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • In praise of inequality: Public good provision and income distribution
    • ITAYA, J., D. DE MEZA, and G. D. MYLES (1997) In praise of inequality: Public good provision and income distribution, Economic Letters 57, 289-296
    • (1997) Economic Letters , vol.57 , pp. 289-296
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  • 15
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    • Individual welfare, majority voting, and the properties of linear income tax
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    • Warr, P.G.1


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