Decision theory and the rationality of further deliberation

Economics and Philosophy

Volumn 18, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 303-328

  Douven, Igor ^a  

^a ERASMUS UNIVERSITY ROTTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 61449495222     PISSN: 02662671     EISSN: 14740028     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0266267102002079     Document Type: Article

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