Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 134, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 537-547

  Ehlers, Lars ^a  

^a Université Laval   (Canada)

Author keywords

Matching problem; Von Neumann Morgenstern stable sets

Indexed keywords

EID: 34247121824     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.03.006     Document Type: Article

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