On monadic domination in Leibniz's metaphysics

British Journal for the History of Philosophy

Volumn 10, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 379-399

  Look, Brandon ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY   (United States)

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EID: 61249509798     PISSN: 09608788     EISSN: 14693526     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09608780210143209     Document Type: Article

References (27)

1. Robert Merrihew Adams, 'Phenomenalism and Corporeal Substance in Leibniz', Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 8 (1983): 230.
2. Robert Merrihew Adams, Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist (Oxford 1994): 285-91.
3. Despite the importance of the relation between dominant and subordinate monads in Leibniz's mature metaphysics, relatively little scholarly attention has been focused on the 'mechanism', so to speak, of domination. Aside from Adams's work, scholars working on Leibniz's late metaphysics in recent years Robinet and Rutherford, for example have simply glossed over the issue, assuming that the relation between dominant and subordinate monads is explicable in the same terms as the relation between the soul and the body. (Cf. André Robinet, Architectonique Disjonctive Automates Systémiques et ldéalité Transcen-dantale dans l'œuvre de G W. Leibniz (Paris 1986);
4. and Donald Rutherford. Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature (Cambridge 1995).)
5. The following abbreviations will be used in this paper: AG = G. W. Leibniz: Philosophical Essays, ed. and trans. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (Indianapolis 1989);
6. C = Leibniz, Opuscules et fragments inédits de Leibniz, ed. Louis Couturat (Paris 1903; reprint Hildesheim 1965);
7. L = Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters, ed. and trans. Leroy E. Loemker (Dordrecht 1969.2nd edn). When there is no reference to AG or L, the translation is my own: when the citation is followed by an asterisk, I have modified the translation.
8. In his aforementioned article ('Phenomenalism and Corporeal Substance'), Adams brings up the same two points for discussion. And while he devotes several pages to the first issue, his primary concern is with the latter. His book treats the first issue as well but essentially in the same way; therefore, I concern myself with the claims of his book. It should be noted, however, that this second question has received a great deal of scholarly attention in the last several years. Nevertheless, such investigations have focused simply on the reality and unity of bodies and not on the monadic relations within a body or an organism that ground the unity of an organism. See, for example, Donald Rutherford, 'Leibniz's "Analysis of Multitude and Phenomena into Unities and Reality"', Journal of the History of Philosophy, 28 (1990): 525-52;
9. 'Phenomenalism and the Reality of Body in Leibniz's Later Philosophy', Studia Leibnitiana, 32 (1990): 11-28;
10. 'Leibniz and the Problem of Monadic Aggregation', Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 76 (1994): 65-90;
11. and Leibniz and. the Rational Order of Nature;
12. Glenn Hartz. 'Leibniz's Phenomenalisms', The Philosophical Review, 101 (1992): 511-49;
13. 'Why Corporeal Substances Keep Popping up in Leibniz's Later Philosophy', British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 6 (1999): 193-207;
14. Paul Lodge, 'Leibniz's Heterogeneity Argument Against the Cartesian Conception of Body', Studia Leibnitiana, 30 (1998): 83-102;
15. and Pauline Phemister, 'Leibniz and the Elements of Compound Bodies'. British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 7 (1999): 57-78.
16. The precise way in which to interpret this claim is difficult, and the literature on this issue is extensive. See, tor example. Hidé Ishiguro, Leibniz's Philosophy of Logic and Language (Cambridge 1990, 2nd edn);
17. John Earman. 'Perceptions and Relations in the Monadology', Studia Leibnitiana 9 (1977): 212-30;
18. Mark Kulstad. 'A Closer Look at Leibniz's Alleged Reduction of Relations'. Southern Journal of Philosophy, 18 (1980): 417-32:
19. James McGuire, 'Phenomenalism, Relations, and Monadic Representations: Leibniz on Predicate Levels', in J. Bogen and J. McGuire, eds, How Things Are (Dordrecht 1985): 205-33;
20. and Massimo Mugnai, Leibniz' Theory of Relations (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner 1992).
21. Robert McRae. Leibniz: Perception, Apperception, and Thought (Toronto 1976): 6:
22. Mark Kulstad, Leibniz on Apperception, Consciousness, and Reflection (Munich 1991): 129:
23. Nicholas Jolley, 'Leibniz and Phenomenalism'. Studia Leibnitiana, 18 (1986): 49.
24. Mark Kulstad. for example, does not include in his rather exhaustive list of Leibniz's uses of 'expression' any instances where a monad expresses another monad. See Kulstad, 'Leibniz's Conception of Expression'. Studia Leibnitiana, 9 (1977): 57.
25. It has only been in some recent work, I think, that the two parts of this issue have been brought out. See, for example, Marleen Rozemond, 'Leibniz and the Union of Body and Soul', Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie'., 79 (1997): 150-78.
26. See my Leibniz and the 'vinculum substantiale' (Stuttgart: Steiner 1999).
27. In other works (Leibniz and the 'vinculum substantiale' (see n. 24) and 'From the Metaphysical Union of Mind and Body to the Real Union of Monads: Leibniz on Supposita and Vincula Substantialia', Southern Journal of Philosophy 1998: 505-29). I have argued that in fact Leibniz realized that his monadology had different conceptual problems and attempted to resolve these problems by an appeal to the vinculum substantiale or substantial bond, as seen in his correspondence with Des Bosses.