Leibniz on the union of body and soul

Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie

Volumn 79, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 150-178

  Rozemond, Marleen ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 61249143767     PISSN: 00039101     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1515/agph.1997.79.2.150     Document Type: Article

References (112)

1. Correspondence de Bossuet (C. Urbain and E. Levesque eds., Paris, Hachette, 1912), vol. 6, p. 348.
2. Draft of the New System, G IV 477.
3. Leibniz states the view in the published version at G IV 484 f., AG 143 f.
4. References to Leibniz' work concern Die Philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, C. I. Gerhardt ed., 7 vols, Berlin, Wiedmann, 1875-90,
5. repr. Hildesheim, Georg Olms, 1978 (G).
6. Translations can be found in G. W. Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber eds., Indianapolis, Hackett, 1989 (AG),
7. and Philosophical Papers and Letters, Leroy E. Loemker ed., Dordrecht, Reidel, 1969 (L).
8. Donald Rutherford presents Descartes's view as an instance of this position (Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 213). But Leibniz did not see it this way.
9. He wrote in the New System: "M. Descartes had given up on this issue, insofar as one can know from his writings." (G IV 483, AG 143)
10. Tournemine, "Conjectures sur l'Union de l'Ame et du Corps", Journal de Trévoux, ou Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire des sciences et des arts, vol. III (May 1703), p. 869.
11. See Robert Merrihew Adams, Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 295;
12. Rutherford, p. 274.
13. See also Daniel Garber, "Leibniz and the Foundations of Physics: The Middle Years" (The Natural Philosophy of Leibniz, K. Okruhlik and J. R. Brown eds., Dordrecht, Reidel, 1985, pp. 27-130), p. 44.
14. See, for instance, Discourse on Metaphysics (DM) 33;
15. and G II 57 f., L 337 f.;
16. G IV 483 f., AG 143 f.;
17. G IV 509 f., AG 160 f.
18. For the letter to des Bosses see G II 354 f.
19. see also G VI 45)
20. For the term 'physical union' see also Principles of Nature and Grace 3, and discussion of this article in Robert Adams, p. 306. Note that Leibniz does not offer any account of the real or metaphysical union. I return to this point later in this section.
21. Garber and Ariew translate the word 'commerce' in the summary as 'union' (AG 64). But either 'intercourse' or 'interaction' is more appropriate.
22. Other texts where Leibniz clearly presents the Harmony as an account of the union as it concerns interaction can be found at G II 57 f., L 337 f.;
23. and André Robinet, Malebranche et Leibniz: relations personnelles (Paris, Vrin, 1955), pp. 314 f.
24. Letter to Clerselier, January 12, 1646, AT IXA 213, CSM II 275.
25. See also the letter to Elizabeth, May 21, 1643, AT III 664 f., CSM III 217 f.
26. For Descartes I provide references to the edition by Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, Œuvres de Descartes (Paris, Vrin 1974-1989, abbreviated as AT).
27. Translations can be found in John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (Cambridge University Press, 1984-91, abbreviated as CSM).
28. Search after Truth, "Preface", Œuvres I pp. 9-19,
29. Selections pp. 3-7;
30. and Book 5 ch. 5, Œuvres II p. 172,
31. Dialogues on Metaphysics and Religion 4. X-XIII, VII.I
32. Selections pp. 222 f.
33. For these references see Œuvres complètes de Malebranche (André Robinet, dir., Paris, Vrin, 1958-1967)
34. and Philosophical Selections, Steven Nadler ed. (Indianapolis, Hackett, 1992).
35. I discuss this issue at length in Descartes's Dualism; Something Old, Something New (forthcoming, Harvard University Press), ch. 5.
36. Search after Truth, "Preface", Œuvres p. 9,
37. For this point see G II 77, 96 f., AG 80, 85 f.,
38. and G II 304, 446.
39. For discussion see Robert Adams, pp. 291 f.,
40. Rutherford, pp. 134, 136,
41. R. C. Sleigh, Jr., Leibniz and Arnauld: A Commentary on Their Correspondence (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1990), p. 110, and ch. 6.
42. See his Disputationes metaphysicae (in Opera Omnia, Paris, Vivès, 1859, vols. 25-26, abbreviated as Disp.), IV.III.8. In light of Suárez' position, what Leibniz might be granting in the Theodicy is that the human being is an ens per se of a kind different from a substance. Noteworthy in this regard is also Leibniz' phrase at the beginning of DM 34: "Supposing that bodies that are unum per se, like man, are substances ...". For here he presents the idea that the human being is an unum per se as assumed, but writes hypothetically about its being a substance. This is interesting in light of the complicated question of Leibniz' attitude towards corporeal substances such as the human being.
43. For discussion of that question see Garber, Leibniz and the Foundations of Physics, Sleigh, ch. 5, Robert Adams, ch. 10.
44. He also points out that on his view there is a genuine unity for the corporeal substance, not the body itself. Leibniz is responding to a question from Arnauld about the unity of corporeal substances in general. Sleigh interprets the passage as meaning that Leibniz thought that there must be an acceptable account of per se unity "because, as we all know, that is how it is with the one corporeal substance we know from the inside out, so to speak - ourselves" (p. 107).
45. Robert Adams, pp. 299-303,
46. Rutherford, pp. 276-282.
47. See especially G II 76 f., AG 79 f.
48. Robert Adams points out a version of this problem (p. 297).
49. Leibniz also seems to account for the unity of body and soul by means of his notion of domination. I will not go into this notion in detail here, but what is important is this: the soul that Leibniz sometimes presents as the form of the body he also sometimes describes as its dominant monad. This monad 'rules' the body and unifies the corporeal substance, the composite of body and soul (letter to de Voider, G II 252). But Leibniz analyzes domination in terms of relations between perceptions of the dominant monad and the states of its body. So domination also seems to reduce to pre-established Harmony. I think that the situation for domination as source for per se unity is essentially the same as for the idea that the substantial form generates per se unity.
50. For discussion of the notion of domination see Robert Adams, pp. 285-291.
51. Robert Adams pp. 305 f.
52. The distinction between the two issues also counts against Rutherford's claim that "As far back as the Discourse on Metaphysics, Leibniz is eager to deflate the problem of the union of the soul and the body" (p. 266).
53. Some statements in his summary of his account of union in the New System might suggest that Leibniz does there claim that the Harmony accounts for per se unity. He writes: "In this way [by way of the Harmony] one can understand how the soul has its seat in the body through an immediate presence, that could not be greater, since it is there as unity is in the result of unities that is a multitude." (G IV 485, AG 144) Now this sentence is rather enigmatic, but I don't see any convincing reason to regard it as concerned with per se unity. The idea of the soul having its seat in the body suggests Leibniz' view that the soul derives its point of view from its Harmony with the body. This interpretation derives support from the fact that in addition the sentence suggests there is nothing more to the union than the Harmony.
54. For in the draft of the New System Leibniz makes that claim right after a comment about the soul's point of view (G IV 477).
55. For the sense of the uncertain nature of the evidence see Garber, pp. 44 f.,
56. Rutherford, ch. 10, especially pp. 266-273.
57. He says so in the New System (G IV 483, AG 142),
58. and also, for instance, later in the correspondence with De Voider (G II 268, 282, L 536, 539).
59. When Leibniz speaks of the Metaphysical Union that philosophers have added, he could have had something further in mind. For some scholastics held that in order for the human being to be an ens per se it was not enough that they be composites of matter and form. They held that there must be some additional entity that unites them. (For discussion of the entity in question in scholasticism, see A. Boehm, Le 'vinculum substantiale' chez Leibniz, Paris, Vrin 1962, especially part 2.) Leibniz could have been thinking of such a position. In fact, the notion of a substantial bond that he discusses in the correspondence with des Bosses is such an entity. It is hard to say whether Leibniz did have this idea in mind, but I find it unlikely.
60. For this view, see also Robert Adams, p. 307.
61. Both Sleigh and Rutherford point to the importance of identity over time in relation to unity. Sleigh writes that "Leibniz did not intend to commit himself to the corporeal substance theory, realistically construed", but that, "nonetheless, Leibniz intended to demonstrate in the correspondence [with Arnauld] that the corporeal substance theory, realistically construed, could be so understood that corporeal substances met the relevant requirements having to do with substantial (true) unity and divisibility" (p. 119). At pp. 125 f. he argues that what matters (one thing that matters?) is identity over time. Rutherford argues that Leibniz was confused between strict per se unity and the idea that a substantial form functions as the principle of identity over time for a body (p. 269).
62. Leibniz writes that he has sent the response in letters to des Bosses dated February 2 and 14 1706 (G II 296, 301).
63. For this issue, see also Rutherford, p. 285 fn. 24.
64. Suárez comments on the difficulty of defining the notions in question. He writes that Aristotle, the source of the distinction, does not define unity per se and per accidens, but merely provides examples (Disp. IV.III.I).
65. Robert Adams, p. 293. Rutherford cites a text from the "Nachlass" where Leibniz himself states that pre-established Harmony merely generates "mental or relational results" (pp. 271 f.).
66. Robert Adams, p. 294.
67. Marilyn McCord Adams discusses the reliance on incompleteness in Ockham and Scotus in William Ockham, Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1987, pp. 665-667.
68. I provide a detailed discussion of the use of this notion by Aquinas and several late scholastics (Suárez, the Coimbra Commentators, Eustachius of St Paul) in my Descartes's Dualism ..., ch. 5.
69. For discussion of the relationship between Suárez and Leibniz see André Robinet, "Suárez im Werk von Leibniz", Studia Leibnitiana, 13, 1981, pp. 76-96.
70. Disp. IV.III.4, 5 and 8.
71. For this idea in Aristotle, see Metaphysics 8.6, 9.6. The actuality of matter and its separability from form were connected for the scholastics. Thus Aquinas denied both that matter has any actuality and that it can be separated even by God.
72. See Summa theologiae (Blackfriars and McGraw-Hill, New York, 1964-, abbreviated as ST) 166.1, III 75.6,
73. Suárez writes that the motivation for the view that matter cannot be conserved separately is the view, which he rejects, that matter has no existence of its own (Disp. XV.IX.2).
74. The idea that matter has actuality posed a problem for the scholastic view that composite substances have per se unity in virtue of the complementarity of actuality and potentiality. In order to solve this problem the scholastics drew a distinction between different types of actuality: the kind that is proper to forms, and the kind that also belongs to matter. Thus form and matter still complement each other with regard to the first kind. See Suárez, Disp. XIII.V.8-11.
75. He ascribes the distinction between types of actuality to Scotus. For a discussion of composite substances in Aquinas, Scotus and Ockham, see Marilyn Adams, Ockham, ch. 15. She discusses the status of prime matter at pp. 639-647.
76. Robert Adams pp. 309 f.
77. De anima 413a3-9, 413b24-26, 429a18-29, 430a18-25. Some aspects of Aristotle's view, however, seem to imply the inseparability of the intellect. The issue in Aristotle is complex and has been subject to much debate by interpreters for many centuries.
78. See, for instance, ST I 76.1, first and sixth objection.
79. Both views can be found in Suárez (Disp. XV.IX.1-3).
80. In addition, numerous scholastics, including Ockham and Scotus, thought that a substance can contain several substantial forms. But Leibniz rejected that idea (G VI 521).
81. For extensive discussion of the view that a substance can have more than one substantial form, see Roberto Zavalloni, Richard de Mediavilla et la controverse sur la pluralité des formes (Louvain, Éditions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1951),
82. See Aquinas, Quaestiones de anima (James H. Robb ed., Toronto, Pontifical Institute for Mediæval Studies, 1968), first question.
83. For a translation see Questions on the Soul (James H. Robb transl., Milwaukee, Marquette University Press, 1984).
84. For Suárez see Disp. XXXIII, I, 4-6.
85. See Disp. IV.III.3, 8.
86. Disp. IV.III.6.
87. Disp. IV.III.13.
88. De anima (in Opera Omnia vol. 3), II.III.3. Unlike Aquinas and Suárez, Ockham held that the sensitive soul is the subject of sense-perception.
89. Cf. Reportatio IV qu. 9, Opera Theologica (Francis E. Kelley and Girard I. Etzkorn eds., St. Bonaventura University, St. Bonaventure, New York, 1982) vol. VII, p. 162. But for him the sensitive soul is really distinct from the intellectual soul.
90. They argued that something that can act per se, in its own right, can also exist per se. Cf. Aquinas ST I 75.2, Summa contra gentiles (Ed. Leonine, Turin, Marietta 1946,
91. for a translation see James F. Anderson transl., Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), II 49-51, Quaestiones de anima, 1.
92. Suárez argues similarly (De anima, I.IX.20).
93. Aquinas, ST I 84.6, 7, 85.1, 86.1. The distinction between the two roles of the imagination is particularly clear at 85.1 ad 5.
94. See his De anima VI.VIII-X.
95. Disp. XV.V.2.
96. See especially G IV 572 f.,
97. but also, for instance, G II 252, III 657.
98. For discussion of this distinction see Robert Adams, pp. 265-267.
99. Cf. Suárez, Disp. IV.III.4.
100. Disp. XVIII.V.2, 3.
101. Robert Adams writes that Leibniz presents the soul as an incomplete substance in the passage just quoted (p. 272). It is true that Leibniz does present the soul as a substance and as incomplete in this passage, but he does not commit himself to the idea that the soul is incomplete qua substance. Certainly, what Leibniz says about incompleteness does not explain why the soul is incomplete qua substance. Incidentally, the same can be said about Descartes;
102. whereas he calls body and mind incomplete and substances, he does not think they are incomplete qua substances (AT VII 222, CSM II 156 f.).
103. See my Descartes's Dualism ..., ch. 5.
104. For this point see also Robert Adams p. 271.
105. Robert Adams p. 294.
106. The fact that the question of separability is not the most fundamental issue for the scholastics is brought out by their notion of a real quality. Generally speaking, qualities are accidents and cannot exist naturally without the substances in which they inhere. But the scholastics recognized a range of qualities, real qualities, that can exist separately by means of God's power. Certainly in Suárez' view there is a similarity between the relationship these qualities bear to their substances and the relationship between matter and form. For substances can exist without their real qualities and vice versa, and matter and form can exist apart from one another. The similarity is especially close for the case of the human being. For the human soul can exist naturally without matter, and a substance can exist naturally without a particular quality. In both cases the converse requires God's power. Yet for Suárez matter and form or soul together constitute an ens per se, substance and quality form the paradigm case of an ens per accidens. For discussion of this issue, see my Descartes's Dualism ..., ch. 4.
107. For the pronouncement by the Lateran Council see Enchiridion symbolorum, definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum, p. 482 f., art. 1440 f., and p. 390, art. 901.
108. The issues that provoked these statements from the Lateran Council are discussed in detail by Etienne Gilson, "Autour de Pomponazzi: problématique de l'immortalité de l'âme en Italie au début du XVIe siècle" and "L'affaire de l'immortalité de l'âme à Venise au début du XVIe siècle" (both in Gilson, Humanisme et Renaissance, Paris, Vrin, 1983).
109. See also Kessler, "The Intellective Soul", The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, Charles B. Schmitt, Quentin Skinner, Eckhard Kessler, and Jill Kraye eds., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 500-507.
110. For a relevant condemnation that occurred in 1706, see Leibniz' correspondence with des Bosses, G II 312-314.
111. The English of the list of condemned propositions can be found in Roger Ariew, "Descartes and Scholasticism: the Intellectual Background to Descartes' Thought", The Cambridge Companion to Descartes, John Cottingham ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 58-90, pp. 89 f.
112. These considerations are also important in relation to Descartes, who occasionally called the human soul a substantial form. When he does so, he is clearly concerned with immortality rather than with the per se unity of the human being. See the letter to Regius of January 1642, AT III 503, 505, CSM III 207 f. I discuss this issue in ch. 5 of my Descartes's Dualism ....