What is a self-referential sentence? Critical remarks on the alleged (non-)circularity of Yablo's paradox

Logique et Analyse

Volumn 45, Issue 177-178, 2002, Pages 3-14

  Leitgeb, Hannes ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SALZBURG   (Austria)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 33947642369     PISSN: 00245836     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (15)

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4. Beall, J.C. 2001a. 'Is Yablo's paradox non-circular?'. Analysis 61, pp176-187
5. Beall, J.C. 2001b. 'Heaps of Gluts and Hyde-ing the Sorites'. Mind 110pp. 401-408
6. Cantini, A. 1996. Logical Frameworks for Truth and AbstractionAmsterdam: Elsevier
7. Gupta, A., and Belnap, N. 1993. The Revision Theory of Truth. CambridgeThe MIT Press
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10. Leitgeb, H. 2001. 'Theories of Truth which have no Standard Models'Studio Logica 68, pp. 69-87
11. McGee, V. 1991. Truth, Vagueness, and Paradox. Indianapolis: HackettPublishing Company
12. Priest, G. 1997. 'Yablo's paradox'. Analysis 57, pp. 236-42
13. Quine, W.V. 1969. 'Ontological Relativity'. In his Ontological Relativityand Other Essays. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 26-68
14. Sorenson, R. 1998. "Yablo's paradox and kindred infiniteliars". Mind 107, pp. 137-55
15. Yablo, S. 1993. 'Paradox without self-reference'. Analysis 53, pp. 251-52