The prospects for Kirk's non-reductive physicalism

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 76, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 323-332

  Melnyk, Andrew ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 61149586657     PISSN: 00048402     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00048409812348451     Document Type: Review

References (8)

1. D. Davidson, 'Mental Events'.
2. Reprinted in his Essays On Actions And Events (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980).
3. R. Kirk, Raw Feeling: A Philosophical Account of the Essence of Consciousness (New York:Clarendon Press, 1994).
4. R. Kirk, 'Strict Implication, Supervenience, and Physicalism', Australasian Journal of Philosophy74 (1996), pp. 244-257.
5. R. Kirk, 'How Physicalists Can Avoid Reduction', Synthèse 108 (1996), pp. 157-170.
6. A. Melnyk, 'Being A Physicalist: How And (More Importantly) Why', Philosophical Studies 74 (1994), pp. 221-241.
7. A. Melnyk, 'Two Cheers For Reductionism; Or, The Dim Prospects For Non-Reductive Materialism', Philosophy of Science 62 (1995), pp. 370-388.
8. A. Melnyk, 'Testament of a Recovering Eliminativist', PSA 1996: Proceedings of the 1996 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association: Supplement To Philosophy of Science 63 (1996),pp. 185-193.