Testament of a recovering eliminativist

Philosophy of Science

Volumn 63, Issue 3 SUPPL., 1996, Pages

  Melnyk, Andrew ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 24944480111     PISSN: 00318248     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/289951     Document Type: Article

References (15)

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3. Hornsby, J. (1985), "Physicalism, Events and Part-Whole Relations", in E. LePore and B. McLaughlin (eds.), Actions and Events. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 444-458.
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9. Levin, M. (1976), "The Extensionality of Causation and Causal-Explanatory Contexts", Philosophy of Science 43 : 266-277.
10. Lewis, D. (1986), "Causal Explanation", in his Philosophical Papers (Vol.2). Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 214-240.
11. Melnyk, A. (1994), "Being A Physicalist: How And (More Importantly) Why", Philosophical Studies 14: 221-241.
12. _. (1995a), "Formulating Physicalism: Two Suggestions", Synthese 105:381-407.
13. _. (1995b), "Two Cheers For Reductionism: Or, The Dim Prospects For Non-Reductive Materialism", Philosophy of Science 62: 370-388.
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15. Von Eckardt, B. (1993), What Is Cognitive Science? Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.