The classificatory sense of "art"

Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

Volumn 61, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 133-148

  Tillinghast, Lauren ^a  

^a KNOX COLLEGE   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 61049087955     PISSN: 00218529     EISSN: 15406245     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1540-6245.00101     Document Type: Review

References (37)

1. Noël Carroll, "Identifying Art," in Institutions of Art: Reconsiderations of George Dickie's Philosophy, ed. Robert J. Yanal (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), pp. 12-13
2. The earliest essay I have found that raises the insufficiency objection is Kendall Walton's review of Dickie's Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis (Cornell University Press, 1974)
3. See Kendall Walton, The Philosophical Review 86 (1977): 97-101
4. The Art Circle: A Theory of Art (New York: Haven, 1984). Reprinted (Evanston, IL: Chicago Spectrum Press, 1997), p. 12
5. The germ of institutionalism is introduced in "Defining Art," American Philosophical Quarterly 5 (1969): 252-258
6. For the remark about never having promised to play according to the original rules, see Dickie, "The Institutional Theory of Art" in Theories of Art Today, ed. Noël Carroll (University of Wisconsin Press, 2000), pp. 103-104
7. Dickie, "The Institutional Theory of Art," p. 96, n. 14
8. Dickie, The Art Circle, p. 52
9. I have altered the order. Dickie's list runs: artist, work of art, public, artworld system, and the artworld. I am indebted to Barbara Scholz's essay, "Rescuing the Institutional Theory of Art: Implicit Definitions and Folk Aesthetics," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 52 (1994): 309-325, for the idea of rearranging the definitions
10. For Dickie's explanation of why he organizes the list as he does, see "The Institutional Theory of Art," pp. 100-101
11. This point is made explicitly on pp. 65-66 of The Art Circle
12. See J. L. Austin, Sense and Sensibilia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), sec. 7
13. Dickie is explicit on this point. He says, for example, "If art is the sort of thing I think it is, the only correct account of it would have to be a circular account." The Art Circle, p. 78
14. Dickie defends circularity, uninformativeness, and arbitrariness in The Art Circle, pp. 75-79. The considerations he offers seem to support the plausible view that answers to philosophical questions will be uninformative in a certain sort of way. It is interesting that many of Dickie's arguments in support of a circular account are compelling arguments against more descriptively rich accounts
15. I have not been able to find a contemporary philosopher who holds this view. Barbara Scholz's essay, "Rescuing the Institutional Theory of Art: Implicit Definitions and Folk Aesthetics," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 52 (1994): 309-325, looks like an example until one notices that on Scholz's understanding of implicit definition, implicit definitions are not sufficient to mark out what is being defined. In different circumstances, I would argue that R. J. Collingwood is a weak institutionalist in The Principles of Art (1938)
16. If the distinguishing feature of the relevant practice is something on the order of making pleasure (or a special kind of pleasure), then we would have a functionalist version of strong institutionalism. A nonfunctionalist example is Stephen Davies's attempt to define a special sort of entitlement that belongs to the practice of art. See Definitions of Art (Cornell University Press, 1991), chap. 4
17. Noël Carroll's remark that I quoted in the opening paragraph, that Dickie would be clearer if he gave up talking about defining "art," suggests that Carroll inclines to partial institutionalism. Robert Stecker also seems to endorse partial institutionalism in his essay, "Is It Reasonable to Attempt to Define Art?" in Theories of Art Today, éd. Noël Carroll (University of Wisconsin Press, 2000), pp. 45-64
18. The terminology belongs to Jeffery Wieand. See "Can There Be an Institutional Theory of Art?" The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 39 (1981): 409-117
19. Promising is a terrific example of an action-institution, but is a pretty difficult concept in its own right. For a discussion of some of the puzzling aspects of a sign that means that the sign-giver's future possibilities of acting well are limited by giving the sign, see G. E. M. Anscombe, "On Promising and Its Justice and Whether It Need Be Respected in Foro Interno: The Collected Papers of G. E. M. Anscombe, vol. 3 (University of Minnesota Press, 1980), pp. 10-21
20. Dickie is thinking of two of Danto's essays in particular. "Artworks and Real Things," Theoria 39 (1973): 1-17
21. Reprinted in Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology, ed. George Dickie and Richard J. Sclafani (New York: St. Martins, 1989), pp. 551-562
22. Arthur Danto, 'The Transfiguration of the Commonplace," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 33 (1974): 139-148
23. But see also "Art and Value," The British Journal of Aesthetics 40 (2000): 228-241, where Dickie concedes the point that this consideration is less than entirely compelling
24. There is an interesting passage near the end of "Art and Value," in which Dickie acknowledges that in regular critical discourse about paintings, pieces of theater, and so on, nobody calls these items "art" except as extremely high praise. What is interesting is that he seems to see this as evidence for a classificatory sense of "art." See p. 236
25. Peter Geach, "Good and Evil," Analysis 17 (1956): 103-112
26. Reprinted in Theories of Ethics, ed. Philippa Foot (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 64-73
27. The first list is from Dickie's Introduction to Aesthetics: An Analytic Approach (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 57
28. For example, by M. W. Rowe, "Why 'Art' Doesn't Have Two Senses," The British Journal of Aesthetics 31 (1991): 214-221
29. See also Graham Oppy, "On Functional Definitions of Art: A Response to Rowe," The British Journal of Aesthetics 33 (1993): 67-71, for criticism of Rowe's tripartite division of nouns and subsequent argument by elimination
30. Berys Gaut, "'Art' as a Cluster Concept," in Theories of Art Today, ed. Noël Carroll (University of Wisconsin Press, 2000), pp. 38-39
31. Dickie wonders whether the derivative "sense" is a genuine sense of "art" or is in fact metaphorical. Either way, the possibility that the classificatory sense straightforwardly and literally applies to cars and pieces of furniture is never considered. I am ignoring Dickie's remarks concerning an "evaluative" sense of "art" that is some sort of generic praise word applying as centrally to the Grand Canyon and sunsets as to The Polish Rider and Hamlet. As others have noticed, nothing in institutionalism implies that there must be any such sense of "art." See Robert Stecker, "The End of an Institutional Theory of Art," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 26 (1986): 124-132
32. Thus, I would object to Robert Stecker's assumption that a definition of "art" is always aimed to explain how people actually use the term. For Stecker's view, see "Is It Reasonable to Attempt to Define Art?" in Theories of Art Today, ed. Noël Carroll (University of Wisconsin Press, 2000), pp. 45-64
33. and the very similar set of suggestions in Richard Kamber, "A Modest Proposal for Defining a Work of Art," The British Journal of Aesthetics 33 (1993): 313-320
34. Ted Cohen, "The Very Idea of Art," National Council on Education for the Ceramic Arts Journal 9 (1988): 7-14. The remark about bookkeepers is on p. 8
35. See also "Reflections on One Idea of Collingwood's Aesthetics," Monist 72 (1982): 581-583
36. David Novitz makes some similar suggestions in "Disputes about Art," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 54 (1996): 153-164
37. On packaging, see Yuriko Saito, "Japanese Aesthetics of Packaging," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 57 (1999): 257-266