Al-Ġazālī's concept of prophecy: The introduction of Avicennan psychology into aš'arite theology

Arabic Sciences and Philosophy

Volumn 14, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 101-144

  Griffel, Frank ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 60949865397     PISSN: 09574239     EISSN: 14740524     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0957423904000025     Document Type: Review

References (214)

1. Al-Ǧāh{dot below}iz{dot below}, H{dot below} uǧaǧ al-nubuwwa (Rasā'il al-Ǧāh{dot below}iz{dot below}, ed. 'Abd al-Salām Muh{dot below}ammad Hārūn, 7 vols. [Cairo, 1399/1979], vol. 3, pp. 223.81), pp. 246, 260
2. and Josef van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert \Hidschra. Eine Geschichte des religiösen Denkens im frühen Islam, 6 vols. (Berlin and New York, 1991-97), vol. 4, pp. 112f., 638-44
3. Richard M. Frank, "Moral obligations in classical Muslim theology," Journal of Religious Ethics, 11 (1983): 205-23, pp. 207ff
4. Ibn Fūrak (d. 406/1015) reports that al-Aš'arī accepted four kinds of indications for the truthfulness (s{dot below}idq) of the messenger: "One way is that miracles attest this. Miracles are the things that - when the messenger claims to have the message - come about in violation of the habitual practice that has occurred previously. A second way is the confirmation of the prophet's veracity (tas{dot below}dīq) expressed by those people who witnessed the miracles. A third one is that, through the prophet's veracity (s{dot below}idq) in his message, those to whom the prophet is sent achieve knowledge about the necessity (of his prophecy). And a fourth one is that messengers who were before him have announced him and identified him (by specifying) his characteristics and his personality in his time, his epoch, his name, and his state." (Ibn Fūrak, Muǧarrad maqālāt al-Šayh{caron below}. Abī al-H{dot below}asan al-Aš'arī, ed. Daniel Gimaret [Beirut, 1986], p. 176.16-20.)
5. On prophecy and the evidence (it{line below}bāt) for prophecies in Aš'arite theology cf. Daniel Gimaret, La doctrine d'al-Ash'arī (Paris, 1990), pp. 453-67, particularly pp. 459f
6. and Michael E. Marmura, "Avicenna's theory of prophecy in the light of Ash'arite theology," in W.S. McCullough (ed.), The Seed of Wisdom. Essays in Honour of T.J. Meek (Toronto, 1964), pp. 159-78, 161-4
7. Ibn Fūrak, Muǧarrad maqālāt al- Aš'arī, pp. 176.21-177.3
8. Gimaret, La doctrine d'al-Ash'arī, p. 460
9. Al-Ǧuwaynī, al-Iršād ilā qawāti' al-adilla fī us{dot below}ūl al-i'tiqād, ed. Muh{dot below}ammad Yūsuf Mūsā and 'Alī 'A. 'Abd al-Hamīd (Cairo, 1369/1950), p. 258.4f
10. Regarding the Iršād, cf. the recent English translation A Guide to Conclusive Proofs for the Principles of Belief by Paul E. Walker (Reading, 2000)
11. Al-Ǧuwaynī's Kitāb al-Burhān fī us{dot below}ūl al-fiqh, ed. 'Abd al-'Az{dot below}īm al-Dīb, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (Cairo, 1400 [1979/80]) vol. 1, pp. 93f
12. Cf. George F. Hourani, "Juwaynī's criticism of Mu'tazilite ethics," The Muslim World, 65 (1975): 161-73
13. (= id., Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics [Cambridge, 1985], pp. 124-34)
14. A. Kevin Reinhard, Before Revelation. The Boundaries of Muslim Moral Thought (Albany, 1995), p. 68
15. Cf. also Tilman Nagel, Die Festung des Glaubens. Triumph und Scheitern des islamischen Rationalismus im 11. Jahrhundert (München, 1988), pp. 214-16
16. Al-Ǧuwaynī, al-Iršād, p. 304.4f
17. Al-Ǧuwaynī, al-Iršād, pp. 307f
18. Fah{caron below}r al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Muh{dot below}as{dot below}s{dot below}al afkār al-mutaqaddimīn wa-al-muta'ah{caron below}h{caron below}irīn min al-'ulamā' wa-al-h{dot below}ukamā' wa-al-mutakallimīn, ed. T{dot below}āhā 'Abd al-Ra'ūf Sa'd (Cairo, 1978), p. 208.12-14
19. A second, more reliable edition of the text is contained in Nas{dot below}īr al-Dīn al-T{dot below}ūsī, Talh{caron below}is al-muh{dot below}as{dot below}s{dot below}al al-ma'rūf bi-naqd al-muh{dot below}as{dot below}s{dot below}al, ed. 'Abdallāh Nūrānī (Teheran, 1980/Beirut, 1985), p. 351.15f
20. Al-Ġazālī, al-Mustas{dot below}fā min 'ilm al-us{dot below}ūl, 2 vols. (Būlāq, 1322-24 [1904-06]) vol. 1, p. 6.6f.: "al-'aql yadullu 'alā s{dot below}idq al-nabīy. "
21. Al-G{dot below}azālī, al-Munqid{line below} min al-dalāl = al-Munqidh min al-d{dot below}alal/Erreur et délivrance, ed. and trans. into French by Farid Jabre, 3rd ed. [Beirut, 1969]), pp. 44.5-11, 43.17f
22. Duncan B. MacDonald, "The life of al-Ghazzālī, with especial references to his religious experience and opinions," Journal of the American Oriental Society, 20 (1899): 71-132, p. 96
23. Arend Th. van Leeuwen, Ghazālī als Apologeet van de Islam (Leiden, 1947), pp. 95-8, p. 181
24. Vincenco M. Poggi, Un Classico della Spiritualià Musulmana (Rome, 1967), pp. 242-5
25. George F. Hourani, "Ghazālī on the ethics of action," Journal of the American Oriental Society, 96 (1976): 69-88, pp. 87f
26. (= id., Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics, pp. 135-66, pp. 165f.)
27. Richard M. McCarthy, Freedom and Fulfillment. An Annotated Translation of Al-Ghazālī's al-Munqidh min al-d{dot below}alāl and Other Relevant Works of al-Ghazālī (Boston, 1980)
28. (= quoted according to the second edition Deliverance from Error [Louisville/Kenn., 2000]), p. 120
29. Richard M. Frank, Al-Ghazālī and the Ash'arite School (Durham and London, 1994), pp. 67f
30. Sabine Schmidtke, The Theology of al-'Allāma al-H{dot below}illī (d. 726/1325) (Berlin, 1991), p. 151
31. Al-Rāzī, Muh{dot below}as{dot below}s{dot below}al, ed. Cairo, pp. 208-12, ed. Teheran/Beirut, pp. 350-6
32. Cf. Max Horten, Die spekulative und positive Theologie des Islam (Leipzig, 1912), pp. 82f
33. On the reservations that rationalist Muslim theologians since al-Naz{dot below}z{dot below}ām (d. 221/836) voiced against the verification of prophecy through tawātur cf. van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, III, 382-4; IV, 334f
34. id., Die Erkenntnislehre des 'Ad{dot below}udaddīn al-Īcī (Wiesbaden, 1966), pp. 308-10
35. Fah{caron below}r al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-Mat{dot below}ālib al-'āliya min al-'ilm al-ilāhī, ed. Muh{dot below}ammad 'Abd al-Salām Šāhīn, 3 vols. (Beirut, 1420/1999), part 8 (included in vol. 3), pp. 44-6
36. The eighth book of the Mat{dot below}ālib al-'āliya on prophecy is also edited by Ah{dot below}mad H{dot below}iǧāzī al-Saqqā under the title al-Nubuwwa wa-mā yata'allaqu bihā (Cairo, 1985) where this passage is pp. 133-9. This edition is to be preferred. Ah{dot below}mad H{dot below}iǧāzī al-Saqqā later published a full edition of the Mat{dot below}ālib (Beirut, 1407/1987) which was not available to me. Al-Rāz̄ dismisses tawātur because the traditions that Jews, Christians and other religious groups transmit prove the possibility of collective error
37. Al-Rāzī, al-Mat{dot below}ālib al-'āliya, ed. Beirut, p. 25, ed. Cairo, p. 107
38. For a short version of this argument cf. Fah{caron below}r al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Ma'ālim us{dot below}ūP l al-dīn, ed. Ah{dot below}mad 'Abd al-Rahīm al-Sāyih{dot below} and Sāmī 'Afīfī H{dot below} iǧāzī (Cairo, 1421/2000), pp. 66-70
39. Al-Rāzī's argument is analyzed by Binyamin Abrahamov, "Religion versus philosophy. The case of Faȟr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's proof for prophecy," Oriente Moderno, 80 (2000): 415-25
40. Cf. also Schmidtke, The Theology of al-'Allāma al-H{dot below}illī, pp. 151f
41. It is not sufficient to say that al-Rāzī's argument is a "necessary proof" for the existence of prophecy as Abrahamov does in "Religion versus philosophy", pp. 420f. Necessity can be understood in at least two ways. First, regarding the epistemological status of the argument (i.e. being logically necessary, allowing no doubts) or, secondly, regarding the ontological status of what is proved to be necessary (i.e. existing necessarily, not being able not to exist). Al-Rāzī's argument claims necessity in both these two meanings
42. This is expressed in al-Rāzī's muqaddima rābi'a of his proof, al-Mat{dot below}ālib al-'āliya, ed. Beirut, p. 62.3f., ed. Cairo, p. 164.20f.: "Deprivation (al-nuqs{dot below}ān) is common within humankind and may even encompass all of it. Except that there must be (lā budda) among them a perfect individual remote from deprivation. The argument (dalīl) for this is as follows [...]"
43. In fact, al-Rāzī - just like Ibn Sīnā in the 3rd chapter of the 10th book of the Metaphysics in the Šifā' - lays down the elements of a successful prophetic message; al-Mat{dot below}ālib al-'āliya, ed. Beirut, pp. 69-72, ed. Cairo, pp. 175-80
44. I follow the text in the Cairo edition. Cf. al-Rāzī, Ma'ālim us{dot below}ūl al-dīn, p. 69
45. Cf. also the translation in Schmidtke, Theology of al-'Allāma al-H{dot below}illī, p. 151f
46. Al-Rāzī singles out al-G{āh{dot below}iz{dot below}, Muh{dot below}as{dot below}s{dot below}al, ed. Cairo, p. 208.12-14, ed. Teheran/Beirut, 351.15f
47. This "second method" (i.e. the one not involving tawātur) is methodologically similar (yaǧrā maǧrā... and min bāb ...) to a demonstratio quare sive propter quid (burhān al-lima; al-Rāzī, al-Mat{dot below}ā lib al-'āliya, ed. Beirut, p. 74, ed. Cairo, p. 184
48. Ma'ālim us{dot below}ūl al-dīn, p. 70.7ff.)
49. The two meanings of epistemological and ontological necessity are combined in this statement. Cf. note 22
50. Ibn Sīnā, De anima (= Avicenna's De Anima, ed. Fazlur Rahman [London, 1959]), pp. 171-8, 248-50; cf. al-Ġazālī's report of these passages in the next chapter
51. Herbert A. Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect. Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect, and Theories of Human I Intellect (New York and Oxford, 1992), p. 87, note 56 disputes Ibn Sīnā 's authorship of this text. Davidson's doubts are prompted by the text's references to al-'aql al-kullī and al-nafs al-kulliyya which do not tally with Ibn Sīnā's scheme of emanative things. The issue is, however, unresolved since scribal errors may be responsible for these inaccuracies. Because al-Ġazālī and al-Rāzī, for instance, may have accepted this text as a work by Ibn Sīnā, we will include Fī it{line below}bāt al-nubuwwāt and refer to it as an Avicennan text
52. Cf. supra footnotes 23 and 24
53. Ibn Sīnā, al-Naǧāt, ed. Muh{dot below}ammad S{dot below}abrī al-Kurdī (Cairo, 1357/1938), p. 167.13.19
54. Ibn Sīnā, De anima, p. 249.11-18.: "[The capacity to hit the middle term (al-h{dot below}add al-awsat{dot below}) in a syllogism] is one of those things that vary both in terms of quantity and quality
55. [...] Because these variations are not limited by a (fixed) border, but always subject to increase and decrease, and because these variations end on the decreasing side with somebody who does have no intuition (h{dot below}ads) at all, the variations must (yaǧibu an) also end at the increasing side with someone who has intuition in regard to all problems or at least most of them, and with someone whose intuition comes in the shortest time or at least quite a short time." This passage is also translated into English in Dimitri Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition (Leiden, 1988), p. 162
56. and into German and discussed in id., "Avicenna: De anima," in Kurt Flasch (ed.), Interpretationen: Hauptwerke der Philosophie: Mittelalter (Stuttgart, 1998), pp. 90-107, 97f. Much of the understanding of this passage rests on the passage "the variations must end ..." (fa-yaǧibu an yantahī ...) in the middle of the sentence. This sentence does not indicate logical necessity, but rather states the fact that the variation of humans being endowed with h{dot below}ads necessarily ranges from having no insight at all to having the perfect insight of a prophet. This does not mean that there are necessarily persons who have these kinds of insight. It just means that the possibility for the existence of these people exists in a necessary manner. When al-Ġazālī paraphrases this passage (cf. infra footnote 45) he rightfully replaces the "yaǧbu an ..." with "ǧāza an ..." ("it is possible that ...") thus making it clear that Ibn Sīnā here just states that prophecy is possible, not that it is necessary
57. Michael E. Marmura, "Avicenna's psychological proof of prophecy," Journal of Near Eastern Studies, 22 (1963): 49-56, p. 49, note 1
58. In his "Avicenna: De anima", pp. 94f
59. and in his Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, p. 162, note 36, Gutas points to the connection of this sentence in the De anima with the proof properly expounded in Fī it{line below}bāt al-nubuwwāt (cf. infra, note 37)
60. Marmura says that Ibn Sīnā argued for the fact that the potential for prophecy exists in a necessary manner. This does not imply that prophecy itself exists necessarily. His analysis is supported by Ibn Sīnā's conclusion of the argument in De anima, p. 249.18f.: "It is thus possible that there is a person amongst humans whose soul has been rendered so powerful through extreme purity and intense contact with intellectual principles that he blazes with h{dot below}ads."
61. (Cf. the translation in Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, p. 162.)
62. Cf. also Ibn Sīnā, al-Naǧāt, p. 166.13-21
63. and Fazlur Rahman, Prophecy in Islam (London, 1958), p. 31
64. Abrahamov, "Religion versus philosophy," p. 421, for instance, does not believe that al-Rāzī succeeds in his proof. He is, however, unaware of the Avicennan background
65. Ibn Sīnā (?), Fī it{line below}bāt al-nubuwwāt (Proof of Prophecies), ed. Michael E. Marmura, 2nd ed. (Beirut, 1991), pp. 42-5
66. This proof and its problems is discussed in Marmura "Avicenna's psychological proof of prophecy," pp. 52.6
67. Dimitri Gutas, "Intuition and thinking: The evolving structure of Avicenna's epistemology," in Robert Wisnovsky (ed.), Aspects of Avicenna (Princeton, 2001), pp. 1-38, at pp. 29f
68. id., "Avicenna: De anima," p. 96
69. Marmura, "Avicenna's psychological proof of prophecy," p. 53
70. I.e. meaning that prophecy is possible in logical terms and thus also a possible being
71. Ibn Sīnā, al-Šifā', al-Ilāhiyyāt, ed. Ibrāhīm Madkūr et al., 2 vols. (Cairo, 1960) vol. 2, pp. 441-3
72. This passage is analyzed by Michael E. Marmura, "Avicenna's theory of prophecy," pp. 169f
73. Al-Ġazālī, Maqās{dot below}id al-falāsifa, ed. Muh{dot below}ammad S{dot below}abrī al-Kurdī, 2nd ed. (Cairo, 1355/1936), part 3, p. 76.5-14. Divine providence ('ināya ilāhiyya) necessitates the sending of prophets who teach humankind the benefits of this world and the next just as it necessitates sending rainfall for this world to prosper
74. Al-Ġazālī, Tahāfut al-falāsifa ( = Algazel, Tahafot al-falasifat, ed. Maurice Bouyges [Beirut, 1927]), p. 273.7-10
75. Significantly, the "it must be that ..." (yaǧibu an ...) of Ibn Sīnā's (De anima, p. 249.16) text is here replaced by "it can be that ..." (ǧāza an ...), making it clear that Ibn Sīnā does not argue for the necessary existence of an individual who has extraordinary h{dot below}ads, but just for the possible existence of him
76. Al-Ġazālī, Tahāfut, pp. 272-4
77. On Ibn Sīnā's three elementary parts of explaining prophecy cf. Dag N. Hasse, Avicenna's De Anima in the West. The Formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul 1160-1300 (London and Turin, 2000), pp. 154-6
78. Rahman, Prophecy in Islam, pp. 30-52
79. and Abdelali Elamrani-Jamal, "De la multiplicité des modes de la prophétie chez Ibn Sīnā," in Jean Jolivet and Roshdi Rashed (eds.), Études sur Avicenne (Paris, 1984), pp. 125-42
80. "Imaginative revelation" is a term used by Fazlur Rahman in his Prophecy in Islam, pp. 36ff. It is maintained here in order to distinguish this way of revelation from "intellectual revelation" mentioned below
81. Al-Ġazālī, Tahāfut, p. 72.10f
82. cf. Ibn Sīnā, De anima, p. 173.12
83. "Intellectual revelation" is also a term coined by Fazlur Rahman in Prophecy in Islam, pp. 30ff
84. Al-Ġazālī, Tahāfut, pp. 272.ult.-274.2
85. cf. Ibn Sīnā, De anima, pp. 248-50
86. On the foundation of Ibn Sīnā's theory of h{dot below}ads within the Aristotelian system of epistemology cf. Gutas, "Avicenna: De anima," pp. 96-105
87. Al-Ġazālī, Tahāfut, p. 275.12f
88. This is the prophetic miracle that Moses performed in front of Pharao, cf. Qur'ān 7.107, 20.69, 26.45
89. According to al-Ġazālī, the falā sifa interpreted the lawh{dot below} mah{dot below}fūz{dot below} metaphorically and understood it as a reference to past and future events that the prophets see in their visions, "the imaginative faculty (quwwa mutah{caron below}ayyila) [...] sees the Preserved Tablet, the forms of future particular events become imprinted in it" (al-Ġazālī, Tahāfut, p. 273.8-10)
90. Al-Ġazālī's own understanding of the lawh{dot below} mah{dot below}fūz{dot below} in his later writings like al-Arba'īn fī us{dot below}ūl al-dīn is, however, hardly different from the falāsifa's position (cf. Richard M. Frank, Creation and the Cosmic System [Heidelberg, 1992], p. 45)
91. Al-Ġazālī, Tahāfut, p. 255.17
92. According to Ibn Sīnā, the source of prophetic visions must be one of the celestial souls (nufūs samāwiyya) which are attached to celestial bodies, the spheres of the planets. These souls have knowledge of the unknown (al-ġayb). The source of imaginative visions requires a bodily organ and this excludes the celestial intellects and the necessary existent being (wāġib al-wuǧūd) itself as the source of the visions. Sīnā, al-Šifā', al-Ilāhiyyāt, II, 437f.)
93. In al-Ġazālī's report of the falā sifa's teachings the source of prophetic visions is called "the angel" (al-malak); al-Ġazālī, Maqās{dot below}id al-falāsifa, part 3, pp. 75f
94. The usage of the word dalīl, "any kind of argument," instead of the stronger burhān, "demonstrative argument," a fortiori stresses al-Ġazālī's claim that the falā sifa are unable to prove their claims
95. Al-Ġazālī, Tahāfut, p. 261.2-5
96. cf. the English translation by Michael E. Marmura in The Incoherence of the Philosophers/Tahāfut al-falāsifa, a parallel English-Arabic text, translated, introduced, and annotated by M.E. Marmura (Provo, 1997), p. 160
97. his "Avicenna's psychological proof of prophecy," p. 49, note 1; and
98. his "Avicenna's theory of prophecy," p. 167
99. From what he says in his Metaphysics, Ibn Sīnā leaves no other possibility than that the source of prophetic visions can only be the celestial souls (cf. supra, footnote 56). In his most explicit treatment of prophetic visions in the psychological part of al-Šifā', Ibn Sīnā leaves open from where the prophets' faculty of imagination receives the visions that make up prophecy. The visions formed in the prophets' imaginative faculty are here described as resulting from a connection "between the unknown (ġayb), between the soul, and between the inner faculty of imagination." (Ibn Sīnā, De anima, p. 178.1f.)
100. On this rule cf. my Apostasie und Toleranz. Die Entwicklung zu al-Ġazālīs Urteil gegen die Philosophie und die Reaktionen der Philosophen (Leiden, 2000), pp. 304-19, 333-5, 432f., and 466f
101. or Marmura, "Avicenna's theory of prophecy," p. 177
102. or his "Al-Ġazali on bodily resurrection and causality in Tahafut and The Iqtisad," Aligarh Journal of Islamic Thought, 2 (1989): 46-75, 49
103. Al-Ġazālī, Tahāfut, pp. 260f. Cf. the English translation by M. Marmura, p. 159
104. "wa-al-manqūl 'anhum qarīb min mad{line below}hab al-falāsifa" (al-Ġazālī, Fad{dot below}ā 'ih{dot below} al-bāt{dot below}iniyya wa-fad{dot below}ā'il al-mustaz{dot below}hiriyya, ed. 'Abd al-Rah{dot below}mān Badawī [Cairo, 1383/1964], p. 40.18f.)
105. On the strategy of al-Ġazālī's criticism in the Tahāfut cf. my "Taqlīd of the philosophers: Al-Ghazali's initial accusation in the Tahāfut," in Sebastian Günther (ed.), Insights into Arabic Literature and Islam. Ideas, Concepts, Modes of Portrayal (Leiden, forthcoming)
106. Al-Ġazālī, Fad{dot below}ā'ih{dot below} al-bāt{dot below}iniyya, pp. 146-68
107. This chapter is selectively translated in McCarthy, Freedom and Fulfillment, pp. 226-34
108. and Ignaz Goldziher, Streitschrift des Gazālī gegen die Bāt{dot below}inīya-Sekte (Leiden, 1916), pp. 51-4, 71-3
109. Cf. also Henri Laoust, La politique de Ġazālī (Paris, 1970), pp. 356.9
110. Cf. my Apostasie und Toleranz, pp. 282-91
111. and my "Toleration and exclusion: al-Shāfi'ī and al-Ghazālī on the treatment of apostates," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 64 (2001): 339-54
112. I have dealt with this passage in my Apostasie und Toleranz, pp. 293-303
113. On the Avicennan writings on the afterlife that al- Ġazālī draws on cf. Jean R. Michot, La destinée de l'homme selon Avicenne. Le retour à Dieu (ma'ād) et l'imagination (Leuven, 1986), pp. 49-54, 190-8
114. There is a second smaller passage earlier in the Mustaz{dot below}hirī that also criticizes the Ismā'īlīs' views on prophecy. It is within the fourth chapter on the exposition of the Ismā'īlī doctrines (Fad{dot below}ā'ih{dot below} al-bāt{dot below}iniyya, pp. 40-2) and it reports the teachings on prophecy as a process of emanation from the celestial souls
115. Al-Ġazālī here refers the reader to his earlier criticism of these teachings in the Tahāfut (Fad{dot below}ā'ih{dot below} al-bāt{dot below}iniyya, p. 42.5)
116. On the respective teachings of the falāsifa cf., for instance, Rahman, Prophecy in Islam, pp. 52-64
117. The same condemnation is expressed in al-Ġazālī's al-Iqtis{dot below}ād fī al-i'tiqād, ed. Huseyn Atay and Ibrahim Agâh Çubukçu (Ankara, 1962), p. 249.6.9
118. and is the small work Mi'rāǧ al-sālikīn (the latter is analyzed in Rahman, Prophecy in Islam, pp. 98f.)
119. On the dating of the Fays{dot below}al cf. my introduction to the German translation of the Fays{dot below}al, Über Rechtgläubigkeit und religiöse Toleranz. Eine Ubersetzung der Schrift Das Kriterium in der Unterscheidung zwischen Islam und Gottlosigkeit (Zurich, 1998), pp. 43-5
120. and Maurice Bouyges, Essai de chronologie des œuvres de al-Ġazali (Algazel), ed. Michel Allard (Beirut, 1959), pp. 46f
121. The Fays{dot below}al is a genuine work of al-Ġazālī. It is mentioned by al-Ġazālī in his al-Munqid{line below} min al-d{dot below}alāl, p. 24
122. and in his al-Mustas{dot below}fā min 'ilm al-us{dot below}ūl, I, 185
123. Cf. my Apostasie und Toleranz im Islam, pp. 304-35
124. For further literature on the Fays{dot below}al cf. Frank, Al-Ghazālī and the Ash'arite School, pp. 76.80
125. Anke von Kügelgen, Averroes und die arabische Moderne. Ansätze zu einer Neubegründung des Rationalismus im Islam (Leiden, 1994), pp. 343-9
126. Iysa A. Bello, The Medieval Islamic Controversy Between Philosophy and Orthodoxy. Ijmā' and Ta'wīl in the Conflict Between al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd (Leiden, 1989), pp. 53.65
127. Hava Lazarus-Yafeh, Studies in Al-Ghazzali (Jerusalem, 1975), p. 37
128. Laoust, La politique de Ghazali, pp. 350.6
129. Hans-Joachim Runge, Über Ġazâlî's Fais{dot below}alal-tafriqa baina-l-islâm wa-l-zandaqa. Untersuchung über die Unterscheidung von Islâm und Ketzerei, Dissertation Kiel, 1938
130. This last publication contains a German translation. The text has also been translated into Spanish by Miguel Asin Palacios, El justo medio en la creencia: Compendio de theología dogmática de Algazel (Madrid, 1929), pp. 499-540
131. into French by Farid Jabre in his La notion de certitude selon Ghazali (Paris, 1958), pp. 406-35
132. and into English by McCarthy in Freedom and Fulfillment, pp. 125-49
133. Cf. also my German translation Über Rechtgläubigkeit und religiöse Toleranz
134. Marmura, "Avicenna's theory of prophecy," pp. 161, 169, 174
135. Al-Ġazālī, Fays{dot below}al al-tafriqa bayna al-Islām wa-al-zandaqa, ed. Sulaymān Dunyā (Cairo, 1381/1961), pp. 134.7f
136. References to the text of the Fays{dot below}al are according to the most widespread edition by S. Dunyā. The text of this edition is, however, only of poor quality. It has been checked and if necessary amended with Mus{dot below}t{dot below}afā al-Qabbānī's edition (Cairo, 1319/1901), with Mah{dot below}mūd Bīǧū's (Damascus, 1413/1993), and with the MSS Berlin, We 1806 and Istanbul, Shehit Ali Pasha 1712
137. On s{dot below}idq cf. al-Ġazālī, Ih{dot below}yā' 'ulūm al-dīn, 4 vols. (Cairo, 1346 [1927-28]) vol. 4, pp. 331f. (XXXVII, 3, 1)
138. It is possible that a person is sincere and truthful in a report that he or she gives, but nevertheless reports things that are not true. On tas{dot below}dīq as the definition of faith in Islam cf. Wilfried Cantwell Smith, "Faith as Tas{dot below}dīq," in Parviz Morewedge (ed.), Islamic Philosophical Theology (Albany, 1979), pp. 96-119
139. and van Ess, Die Erkenntnislehre, pp. 70f
140. Cf. my Apostasy und Toleranz, index; Richard M. Frank, "Knowledge and taqlīd. The foundation of religious belief in classical Ash'arism," Journal of the American Oriental Society, 109 (1989): 37-62
141. Al-Aš'arī: Kitāb al-Luma' (= The Theology of al-Ash'arī. The Arabic Texts of al-Ash'arī's Kitāb al-Luma' and Risā lat Istih{dot below}sān al-khawd{dot below} fī 'ilm al-kalām, ed. R.J. McCarthy [Beirut, 1953]), § 180
142. On the early Aš'arite concept of belief as tas{dot below}dīq bi-Allāh or li-Allāh cf. Frank, "Knowledge and taqlīd," pp. 40ff
143. Al-Bāqillānī, Kitāb al-Tamhīd, ed Richard J. McCarthy (Beirut, 1957), p. 348
144. Al-Ǧuwaynī, al-Iršād, p. 397.1-2
145. Abū al-Qāsim al-Ans{dot below}ārī (d. 511 or
146. al-Kiyā al-Harrāsī (d. 504/1110) Us{dot below}ūl al-dīn, MS Cairo, Dār al-Kutub, kalām 290, fols. 241bf. is unspecific on the object of tas{dot below}dīq, but defines kufr as takd̄īb bi-Allāh
147. Van Ess, Die Erkenntnislehre, pp. 95ff., 110f
148. Deborah L. Black, Logic and Aristotle's Rhetoric and Poetics in Medieval Arabic Philosophy (Leiden, 1990),p. 71
149. Renate Würsch, Avicennas Bearbeitung der aristotelischen Rhetorik: ein Beitrag zum Fortleben antiken Bildungsgutes in der islamischen Welt (Berlin, 1991), pp. 22, 24
150. Harry A. Wolfson, "The terms tas{dot below}awwur and tas{dot below}dīq in Arabic philosophy and their Greek, Latin and Hebrew equivalents," The Moslim World, 33 (1943): 114.28
151. Elamrani-Jamal, "De la multiplicite des modes de la prophetie chez Ibn Sīnā ," pp. 126ff
152. On this second meaning of tas{dot below}dīq in Ibn Sīnā's logical works cf. his Second Analytics (= al-Šifā', al-Mant{dot below}iq, al-Burhān, ed. Ibrāhīm Madkūr and Abū al-'Alā 'Afīfī [Cairo, 1375/1956]), pp. 51.8-52.2 which distinguishes the strength of tas{dot below}dīq according to the means of persuasion (iqnā') that support the proposition. The word "tas{dot below}dīq" is strictly speaking equivocal in three meanings: (1) belief, (2) propositional knowledge, and (3) the truth judgment that supports the proposition (tas{dot below}dīq) itself. In this last meaning the word tas{dot below}dīq also applies to tas{dot below}awwur (non-propositional knowledge). This is expressed in Ibn Sīnā's al-Naǧāt, p. 60.13f., where he says that "it is possible that there is a tas{dot below}awwur without tas{dot below}dīq like, for instance, in the case that someone imagines (yatas{dot below}awwaru) the words of another man who says that an empty room exists and he (scil. the first man) does not consider it true (wa-lā yus{dot below}addiqu bihi)." (On this cf. van Ess, Die Erkenntnislehre, p. 100.)
153. Cf. al-Ġazālī's treatment of the several equivocations of tas{dot below}dīq in his al-Iqtis{dot below}ād fī al-i'tiqād, p. 225.11.15 where different degrees of tas{dot below}dīq are mentioned
154. For a more thorough discussion of the different meanings of tas{dot below}dīq and how they are used by al-Ġazālī in his Fays{dot below}al cf. my introduction to Über Rechtgläubigkeit und religiöse Toleranz, pp. 34.6
155. Al-Ġazālī has an interesting technique to nonchalantly weave important premises of his later arguments or assumptions of his views into early passages of his writings. Equally here, where in the first chapter he already defines tas{dot below}dīq and takd{line below}īb as applying only to propositions. During a passage where he discusses the three books of revelation (Torah, Gospel, and Qur'ān) and their character as propositions (h{caron below}abar), he reminds his readers that these books also contain imperatives and prohibitions and says, "These three [books of revelation] are different in their essences (h{dot below}aqā'iq ). How could it be otherwise, since the definition of a proposition (h{caron below}abar) is: 'That which is subject to affirmation and negation (tas{dot below}dīq and takd{line below}īb).' These two, however, can not be applied to an imperative and not to a prohibition. But how is it possible that one thing is subject to tas{dot below}dīq and takd{line below}īb and at the same time it is not? And how can the negation and the affirmation to one thing be united?" (Fays{dot below}al, p. 132.6-9). The fact that the books of revelation contain different imperatives and prohibitions leads to the conclusion that only the propositions they contain can be compared in term of their truth-claims
156. Cf. Ibn Sīnā's definition of tas{dot below}dīq in his al-Šifā', al-Mant{dot below}iq, al-Madh{caron below}al, ed. Ibrāhīm Madkūr et al. (Cairo, 1953), p. 17.16f. "Tas{dot below}dīq is when there comes about in the mind a connection between this picture (or form) and the things themselves in the way that the picture is correlating (mut{dot below}ābiq) to the things."
157. Al-Ġazālī, Fays{dot below}al, p. 175.15f
158. Cf., for instance, al-Ġazālī, Mi'yār al-'ilm, ed. Sulaymān Dunyā (Cairo, 1961), pp. 76.7f., 330.1ff., 383.1ff
159. id., Ilǧām al-'awāmm 'an 'ilm al-kalām, ed. Muh{dot below}ammad M. al-Baġdādī (Beirut, 1406/1985), pp. 107f
160. and id., Ih{dot below}yā' 'ulūm al-dīn, II, 18.11. (XXI, 9,1) or IV, 218.2 (XXXV.2). This usage seems to be inspired by philosophical literature
161. Cf. Ibn Sīnā's usage of al-muh{caron below}bar 'anhu in al-Šifā', al-Ilāhiyyāt, I, 34.7
162. Al-Ġazālī, Fays{dot below}al, p. 176.4-7
163. Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect, pp. 98ff
164. Harry A. Wolfson, "The internal senses in Latin, Arabic and Hebrew
165. Gotthard Strohmaier, "Avicennas Lehre von den 'Inneren Sinnen' und ihre Voraussetzungen bei Galen," in P. Manuli and M. Vegetti (eds.), Le opere psicologiche di Galeno (Naples, 1988), pp. 231-42
166. Cf., for instance, al-Ġazālī, Ih{dot below}yā' 'ulūm al-dīn, IV, 219. 4th line from bottom (XXXV, 2)
167. cf. also III, 18.11. (XXI, 9, 1) where the world and its beings are described in three categories (1.) the "real being" (wuǧūd h{dot below}aqīqī), imaginative (h{caron below}ayālī) being, and conceptual/intellectual ('aqlī) being. Jules Janssens in a recent article analyzes how al-Ġazālī's works show different applications of Ibn Sīnā's different models to explain the inner senses based on different books by Ibn Sīnā, "Al-Ghazzālī and his use of Avicennian texts," in Miklós Maróth (ed.), Problems in Arabic Philosophy (Budapest, 2003), pp. 37-49
168. Cf. Gutas, "Intuition and thinking," pp. 8ff
169. Al-Ġazālī, Tahāfut al-falasifa, pp. 298-303
170. The 18th discussion of al-Ġazālī's Tahāfut al-falāsifa has recently been analyzed in Timothy J. Gianotti, Al-Ghazālī's Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul. Unveiling the Esoteric Psychology and Eschatology of the Ih{dot below}yā' (Leiden, 2001), pp. 95.103
171. Al-Ġazālī, Ma'āriǧ al-quds fī madāriǧ ma'rifat al-nafs, ed. Mah{dot below}mūd Bīǧū (Damascus, 1413/1992), pp. 56f. This division includes a fourth category, wahm (estimation), between h{caron below)yāl and 'aql. I am grateful to Hikmatullah Sahib who made much of his unpublished work on the Ma'āriǧ al-quds accessible to me
172. Most of these questions are put together by Timothy J. Gianotti in his Al-Ghazālī's Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul, pp. 115f., who is unaware of the existence of the Ma'āriǧ al-quds
173. Voiced first by Georges Vajda, "Le ma'āriǧ al-quds fī madāriǧ ma'rifat al-nafs attribué à al-Ġazālī et les écrits d'Ibn Sīnā," Israel Oriental Studies, 2 (1972): 470-3
174. and seconded by Jules Janssens, "Le Ma'ârij al-quds fî madarij ma'rifat al-nafs: un élément-clé pour le dossier Ghazzâlî-Ibn Sînâ?", Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du Moyen Age, 60 (1993): 27-55
175. Cf. Jules Janssens' forthcoming article "Al-Ghazzālī and his use of Avicennian texts" where he renounced his earlier view that this book is not written by al-Ġazālī and counts it now amongst the writings of al-Ġazālī. The author was a highly original thinker whose ideas are quite complex, and the words of Georges Vajda, "le Ma'āriǧ mériterait une étude d'ensemble" are still valid. A comparison between Ibn Sīnā's psychology and that of al-Ġazālī which includes the Ma'āriǧ al-quds has been attempted by Ǧamāl Raǧab Sīdbī, Naz{dot below}ariyyat al-nafs bayna Ibn Sīnā wa-al-Ġazālī (Cairo, 2000)
176. and Muh{dot below}ammad H{dot below}usaynī Abū Sa'da, al-At{line below}ār al-sīnāwiyya fī mad{line below}hab al-Ġazālī fī al-nafs al-insāniyya (Cairo, 1991)
177. Ibn Sīnā, al-Šifā', al-Ilāhiyyāt, I, 97.4-152; II, 303.15-304.4
178. cf. id., Kitāb al-Naǧāt, p. 99
179. Al-Ġazālī, Maqāsid al-falāsifa, part 2, pp. 37-9
180. My English translation of "similar being" has been chosen following the Latin translation of Domenicus Gundissalinus (Logica et philosophia Algazelis philosophia Algazelis Arabis [Frankfurt, 1969] = reprint of the Venice, 1506 print, fol. 21v) who translates the union through mǔābaha as unio per simultudo
181. Ibn Sīnā, al-Ǐārāt wa-al- tanbīhāt, ed. Sulaymān Dunyā, 4 vols. (Cairo, 1960-68), vol. 2, pp. 367f
182. The passage is translated and discussed by Dag N. Hasse, "Avicenna on abstraction," in Wisnovsky (ed.), Aspects of Avicenna, pp. 39-72, at pp. 60f
183. Cf. al-Ǧuwaynī's statement in the Iršād, p. 174.10f that "the ahl al-h{dot below}aqq agree upon the view that all being (kull mawǧūd) can be seen."
184. The matter, however, is not that simple, as al-Ǧuwaynī's student al-Ans{dot below}ārī points out in his Šarh{dot below} al-Iršād. First Part, MS Princeton University Library, ELS 634, fols. 160bff. Recent studies have confirmed the complexity of this subject. Cf. Richard M. Frank, "The non-existent and the possible in classical Ash'arite teaching," Mélanges de l'Institut Dominicain d'Études Orientales, 24 (2000): 1-37
185. and id., "The Aš'arite ontology: I. Primary entities," Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, 9 (1999): 163-231
186. The ontological positions of mutakallimūn and falāsifa seem to be less distinct from one another than initially thought and may indeed be connected from the early days of their generation, cf. Robert Wisnovsky, "Notes on Avicenna's concept of thingness," Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, 10 (2000): 181-221
187. and Jean Jolivet, "Aux origines de l'ontologie d'Ibn Sīnā," in Jolivet and Rashed (eds.), Études sur Avicenne, pp. 11-28
188. Al-Ǧuwaynī, al-Iršād, p. 104.5ff
189. I am grateful to Paul Walker and David Vishanoff who directed me to this passage. Cf. Nagel, Die Festung des Glaubens, p. 147. The concept of soul speech is discussed in some length in al-Ans{dot below}ārī's Šarh{dot below} al-Iršād. First Part, fols. 87bff
190. Cf. the Chapter I.5 of Ibn Sīnā's Metaphysics where "being in the soul" (wuǧūd fī al-nafs) is qualified as "that which is reported of" (allad{line below}ī mā yuh{caron below}baru'anhū). "The act of reporting (ih{caron below}bār) is in its essential meaning reporting of the existent thing (al-mawǧūd) in the soul, and only in its accidental meaning reporting of the existent thing outside [of it]." (al-S{ifā', al-Ilāhiyyāt, I, 34.7-9.) In his Iqtis{dot below}ād fī al-i'tiqād, p. 62.12, al-Ġazālī gives the example of the connection between what is known and what is the object of this knowledge as an example for a necessary connection: "mā 'ulima wuqū'uhu fa-wuqū'uhu wāǧib."
191. Al-Ġazālī, Fays{dot below}al, p. 184.1-4
192. On al-Ġazālī's criteria of distinguishing unbelief from belief according to the "fundamental elements of the creed" (us{dot below}ūl al-'aqā'id) and his subsequent "law" (qānūn) cf. Fays{dot below}al, pp. 195.6ff
193. and my Apostasie und Toleranz, pp. 304-19
194. On this "law of interpretation" (qānūn al-ta'wīl) which is distinct from the "law" referred to in the previous footnote, cf. Fays{dot below}al, pp. 187-9
195. and my Apostasie und Toleranz, pp. 333-5. The content of the "law of interpretation" is explained earlier in this paper, cf. footnote 61
196. Richard M. Frank, "Currents and countercurrents," in Peter Rifel and Tony Street (eds.), Islam: Essays on Scripture Thought and Society (Leiden, 1997), pp. 111.34, p. 127. Al-Ġazālī seems to replace some references to emanation in the teachings of the falā sifa with references to a process of revelation (wahm) in his own teachings. It needs, of course, to be analyzed what wahm really means for al-Ġazālī
197. Cf. supra footnote 115
198. What is possible is according to al-Ġazālī not already existing. In fact, the change from possibility to actuality is the result of an act of the creator. The predication of possible beings does not already involve a statement on the existence of the objects of predication. This is also the ontology he follows in his Maqs{dot below}ad al-asnā, his Iqtis{dot below}ād, and other of his works, cf. Frank, Creation and the Cosmic System, pp. 53f and 62f
199. Rahman quotes al-Ġazālī's Mi'rāǧ al-sālikīn, which repeats the earlier condemnation of the Fad{dot below}āih{dot below} al-bāt{dot below}iniyya analyzed above
200. This must not be understood as a departure from Ibn Sīnā. His two-fold division of revelation in imaginative and intellectual should also be regarded as a result of the various divisions of the inner senses (h{dot below}awāss bāt{dot below}ina), cf. Elamrani-Jamal, "De la multiplicité des modes de prophétie chez Ibn Sīnā, " pp. 129-36
201. And books depending on this like, for instance, al-Iqtis{dot below}ād fī al-i'tiqād or Mi'rāǧ al-sā likīn
202. Al-Ġazālī, Fays{dot below}al, p. 134.9
203. Reinhard, Before Revelation, pp. 72f
204. Hourani, "Ghazālī on the ethics of action," (= id., Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics, pp. 135-66)
205. Michael E. Marmura, "Ghazālī on ethical premises," The Philosophical Forum, N.S. 1 (1969): 393-403
206. Al-Ġazālī, al-Munqid{line below} min al-d{dot below}alāl, p. 43.18-ult
207. In his al-Risāla al-Laduniyya (in: al-Qus{dot below}ūr al-'awālī min rasā'il Imām al-Ghazālī [Cairo, 1964], pp. 97-122), p. 101.13-15 al-Ġazālī says that those engaged in s{dot below}ūfism (al-mutas{dot below}awwifa) use "qalb" for the substance (ǧawhar) that the philosophers (al-h{dot below}ukamā') call "al-nafs al-nāt{dot below}iqa."
208. MS Berlin, Spr. 1968 (Ahlwardt 3210), fol. 41b probably has the more complete textual version and says that the mutas{dot below}awwifa call this substance "sometimes the qalb and sometimes the rūh{dot below}."
209. Three lines later, both texts have: "al-qalb and al-rūh{dot below} are for us ('indanā) names for al-nafs al-nāt{dot below}iqa." On the usage of qalb in the meaning of "soul" cf. also Gianotti, Al-Ghazālī's Unspeakable Doctrine, pp. 13, 178
210. This criterion for verifying the claims of a prophet doesn't seem to be entirely unknown to Aš'arite scholarship. It seems to be close to the third criterion of al-Aš'arī reported by Ibn Fūrak (cf. footnote 3). In al-Ġazālī it is clearly influenced by both philosophical literature as well as s{dot below}ūP fism. As stated earlier, the statements on prophecy in the psychological part of Ibn Sīnā's al-Šifā' were understood as explanations of how prophecy must occur, if it occurs (p. 117 of this paper). Much of the philosophical body of literature on prophecy should be understood as setting such standards for the acceptance of a true prophet. Philosophical literature often compares the work of the prophet with the work of the physician. Cf., for instance, al-Fārābī, Kitāb Tah{dot below}s{dot below}īl al-sa'āda (The Attainment of Happiness) (Hayderabad, 1345), pp. 46f., ed. Ǧa'far Āzl Yāsīn, 2nd ed. (Beirut, 1403/1983), p. 97
211. An illuminating example of the dispute between falāsifa and religious scholars on whether the effect of the prophet's work can be compared to that of the physician is the discussion between one of the authors of the Rasā'il Ih{caron below}wān al-s{dot below}afā', Muh{dot below}ammad ibn Ma'šar al-Bīstī al-Maqdisī, with a young scholar named al-H{dot below} arīrī reported by al-Tawh{dot below}īdī in al-Imtā' wa-al-mu'ānasa, ed. Ah{dot below}mad Amīn and Ah{dot below}mad Zayn, 2 vols. (Cairo, 1373/1952), vol. 2, pp. 11ff
212. One of the more explicit passages where al-Ġazālī deals with the source of revelation is in Ma'āriǧ al-quds, p. 115.21-22
213. (translated in Rahman, Prophecy in Islam, p. 97) where the revelation is portrayed as coming from spiritual beings (rūh{dot below} āniyyāt), who are determined to preserve the order of the word and who act according to God's command (amr)
214. I would like to thank Peter Adamson, Richard M. Frank, Tariq Jaffer and two anonymous readers for their invaluable comments on earlier drafts of this article