The peculiar motion of Aristotelian souls

Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society, Supplementary Volumes

Volumn 81, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 139-161

  Shields, Christopher ^a  

^a NONE

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Indexed keywords

EID: 60949525326     PISSN: 03097013     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8349.2007.00154.x     Document Type: Article

References (12)

1. Barnes, J. 1972: 'Aristotle's Concept of Mind', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 72, pp. 101-10.
2. Cherniss, H. 1971: Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy (New York: Octagon Books).
3. Granger, H. 1995: 'Aristotle on the Subjecthood of Form', Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 13, pp. 135-60.
4. Hicks, R. D. 1907: Aristotle: De Anima (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
5. Menn, S. 2002: 'Aristotle's Definition of Soul and the Programme of the De Anima', Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 22, pp. 83-139.
6. Ross, W. D. 1936: Aristotle: Physics (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
7. Ryle, G. 1949: The Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson).
8. Shoemaker, S. 1984: 'On An Argument for Dualism', in Identity, Cause, and Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 287-308.
9. Shields, C. 1988: 'Soul as Subject in Aristotle's De Anima', Classical Quarterly, 38, pp. 140-9.
10. - 1995: 'The Subjecthood of Souls and Some Other Forms: A Response to Granger', Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 13, pp. 161-76.
11. Tweedale, M. 1990: 'Aristotle's Motionless Soul', Dialogue, 29, pp. 123-32.
12. Witt, C. 1992: 'Dialectic, Motion, and Perception: De Anima, Book 1', in M. C. Nussbaum and A. O. Rorty (eds.), Essays on Aristotle's De Anima (Oxford: Oxford University Press).