Rule-consequentialism and obligations toward the needy

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 79, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 19-33

  Hooker, Brad ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF READING   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 60949467675     PISSN: 02790750     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0114.00048     Document Type: Article

References (46)

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43. Mulgan, "One False Virtue of Rule Consequentialism, and One New Vice", § 2.
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