One false virtue of rule consequentialism, and one new vice

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 77, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 362-373

  Mulgan, Tim ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OTAGO   (New Zealand)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0141791944     PISSN: 02790750     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.1996.tb00176.x     Document Type: Article

References (8)

1. See R. Brandt, Morality, Utilitarianism, and Rights, p. 111 ff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992)
2. and B. Hooker, "Rule Consequentialism", Mind 99 (1990) pp. 67-77 for representative statements of RC
3. Hooker himself discusses the problem of applying RC to cases of partial compliance at some length elsewhere. (See B. Hooker, "Rule- Consequentialism, Incoherence, Fairness", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95 (1994), pp. 19-35
4. and "Comprising with Convention", American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (1994), pp. 311-17. However, he does not seem to notice that the attempt to find plausible rules for partial compliance may be incompatible with the claim that RC will only demand sacrifices of 10% in the actual world
5. Another solution to the problem of partial compliance is provided by Donald Regan's Cooperative Consequentialism. (See D. Regan, Utilitarianism and Cooperation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980)). This view is fairly complicated, but it consists essentially of recommending the following decision procedure to moral agents. Step 1: identify all potential cooperators. Step 2: predict the likely responses of non-cooperators to various patterns of behaviour by potential cooperators. Treat those responses as given. Step 3: play my role in the optimum cooperative strategy. For our purposes, the principal problem with Cooperative Consequentialism is that, in situations of very widespread non-compliance, it will not be much less demanding than AC. For instance, consider the case of famine relief in the actual world. The amount of good to be done is very great, whereas the number of people who are willing to cooperate to do that good is pretty small. So each person's share will be substantial, and Cooperative Consequentialism will place significant demands on people. If RCists seek a theory which doesn't make great demands in the actual world, then they will not be satisfied with Regan's solution
6. A similar tale is discussed in J. Carens, Equality, Moral Incentives, and the Market: An Essay in Utopian Politico-Economic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981)
7. See also the discussion of related issues in G.A. Cohen, "Incentives, Inequality and Community", in Tanner Lectures on Human Values (volume 13), G.B. Peterson, ed. (Salt Lake City, University of Utah Press, 1992)
8. It might be argued that, in the absence of solid empirical evidence one way or the other, the most one should conclude is that RC might be unreasonably demanding, which is hardly sufficient grounds for condemnation. However, I would suggest that defenders of RC would be well advised to avoid this line of reply. Any acceptable moral theory must (inter alia) meet two general criteria: (i) it must give comparatively clear judgments regarding the moral requirements faced by particular agents in particular situations; and (ii) it must not make those requirements depend upon the wrong empirical facts. If we cannot have any idea how much RC will demand of us without becoming experts in the empirical economics of redistribution and productivity, then RC fails on both counts. It is absurd to suggest that Affluent must become an economist before she has any idea how much (or even whether) she should donate to Oxfam. It is also absurd to suggest that, if for some reason the relevant empirical information is unobtainable, then there is no fact of the matter as to what is required of actual moral agents. RC would thus be able to avoid the charge of unreasonable demandingness only by leaving itself open to charges of unreasonable complexity and of giving inappropriate weight to the wrong empirical factors. (Another version of this first charge is presented in the next section. The latter charge, which I have dubbed the "Wrong Facts Objection", is explored in more detail in T. Mulgan, "Rule, Consequentialism and Famine", Analysis 54, pp. 187-92, 1994.)