Is experience transparent?

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 117, Issue 1-2, 2004, Pages 15-41

  Siewert, Charles ^a  

^a Department of Biology   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 6344279949     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/b:phil.0000014523.89489.59     Document Type: Review

References (13)

1. Block, N. (1998): 'Is Experience Just Representing?', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58, 663-670.
2. Chalmers, D. (2004): 'The Representational Character of Experience', in Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press (forthcoming).
3. Crane, T. (2002): 'The Intentional Structure of Consciousness', in Smith and Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
4. Dretske, F. (1995): Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
5. Harman, G. (1990): 'The Intrinsic Quality of Experience', in J. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 4, Atascadero: Ridgeview Press.
6. Horgan, T. and Tienson, J. (2002): 'The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality', in Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
7. Kind, A. (2003): 'What's So Transparent About Transparency?', Philosophical Studies (forthcoming).
8. Peacocke, C. (1983): Sense and Content, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
9. Shoemaker, S. (1996): The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
10. Siewert, C. (1998): The Significance of Consciousness, Princeton University Press.
11. Siewert, C. (2001): 'Consciousnes Neglect and Inner Sense: Reply to Lycan', Psyche 7, 7.
12. Tye, M. (1995): Ten Problems of Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
13. Tye. M. (2002): Consciousness, Color and Content, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.