Concept and intuition. On distinguishability and separability

Hegel-Studien

Volumn 39-40, Issue , 2004, Pages 25-39

  Pippin, Robert B ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 60949253608     PISSN: 00731587     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (19)

1. See: Immanuel Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft. A 51/B 75
2. See: Robert B. Pippin: Hegel's Idealism. The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness. Cambridge 1989. (HI hereafter.)
3. See: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: Glauben und Wissen. - In: Idem: Gesammelte Werke. Herausgegeben im Auftrag der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft. Band 4. Herausgegeben von Hartmut Buchner und Otto Pöggeler. Hamburg 1968. P.343. (GW 4 hereafter.)
4. Faith and Knowledge. Translated by Walter Cerf and Henry S. Harris. Albany 1977. P.92. (BK hereafter.)
5. See: GW 4, p. 327
6. All of these formulations by Hegel are of course subject to multiple possible interpretations. On this issue see my: Die Begriffslogik als die Logik der Freiheit. - In: Hegel-Studien 36 (2001). Pp. 97-115
7. See: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: The Berlin Phenomenology. Translated by Michael J. Petry. Dordrecht 1981. P.2
8. Just on the face of it, someone claiming that "X cannot be representationally significant except as Y'ed" cannot be assumed to be claiming "There are no X's; there is only Y'ing," or even to be claiming "X's not playing a representationally significant role means it plays no role whatsoever, has no function within knowledge claims." (I borrow the useful phrase, "representationally significant" from: Robert Hanna: Kant and Non-Conceptual Content. - In: European Journal of Philosophy. 13 [2005], 2, pp. 247-290.)
9. See: Miriam Wildenauer: The Epistemic Role of Intuitions and their forms in Hegel's Philosophy. - In: Hegel-Studien 38 (2003). Pp. 83-104. (ERI hereafter.)
10. In contrast, say, to: Gareth Evans: The Varieties of Reference. Oxford 1982. P. 227
11. See: Immanuel Kant: Philosophical Correspondence. 1759-99. Translatetd by Arnulf Zweig. Chicago 1967. Pp. 310f
12. See: Wilfrid Sellars: Science and Metaphysics. Variations on Kantian Themes. New York 1963. - Contra Wildenauer, all of this is perfectly consistent with Hegel's robust criticism of Jacobi's version of Kant's distinction in Glauben und Wissen
13. See: Robert B. Pippin: Hegel's Original Insight. - In: International Philosophical Quarterly. XXXIII (1993), 3, 285-96. - I do not know how the remarks there on p. 291 could be any clearer on this point
14. See: Harold A. Prichard: Kant's Theory of Knowledge. Oxford 1969
15. See: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830). Erster Teil. Die Wissenschaft der Logik. Mit den mündlichen Zusätzen. - In: Theorie-Werkausgabe. Bd. 8. Auf der Grundlage der Werke von 1832-1845 neu edierte Ausgabe. Redaktion Eva Moldenhauer und Karl Markus Michel. Frankfurt a. M. 1970. P. 18
16. Hegel's Logic. Part One of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences. Translated by William Wallace. Oxford 1875. P. 58
17. If concept and intuition are radically inseparable, then not only is a pure or foundational empiricism excluded, but Kant's doctrine of transcendental formality is also being rejected and we will need another way to account for concept determinacy and (especially in Hegel) basic conceptual change. - For the relevance of this issue to similar questions in Brandom's appropriation of Hegel, see my: Brandom's Hegel. - In: The European Journal of Philosophy. 13 (2005), 3, p. 381-408
18. See his remark that Hegelian reason "includes as a moment within itself the receptivity that Kant attributes to sensibility" - In: John McDowell: Having the World in View. Sellars, Kant, and Intentionality. - In: Journal of Philosophy 95 (1998). 466
19. See: Michael Friedman: Exorcising the Philosophical Tradition. - In: Nicholas Smith (Ed.): Reading McDowell. On Mind and World. London 2002. 25-57, especially p. 33