The epistemic role of intuitions and their forms in Hegel's philosophy

Hegel-Studien

Volumn 38, Issue , 2003, Pages 83-104

  Wildenauer, Miriam ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 60949354169     PISSN: 00731587     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (16)

1. Robert B. Pippin: Hegel's Idealism: The Satisfaction of Self-Consciousness. Cambridge 1989. 29, 84, 92
2. "[...] impossibility of grounding a subject's spontaneous, transcendentally required constitution of experience in pure intuition. We must understand what a subject desires in its interchange with the world, and the way in which its satisfaction with its desires and strategies for satisfying them are mediated by its experience of other subjects. [...] this chapter [Force and Understanding] establishes its Kantian conclusions about nonsensible conditions, without the Kantian theory of pure intuition." (Robert B. Pippin: Idealism. 134); "that any claim-making activity can count as a possibly objective judgment only within the 'practice' or'institution governing such judging, and that there is such a practice only insofar as a community of participants take themselves to be participating in it, within constraints that define it as that and no other practice. [...]
3. References of the form 'xx. yyy' refer to the Suhrkamp edition of Hegel's Werke. The initials GuW stand for Glauben und Wissen, WdL for Wissenschaft der Logik, the abbreviation Enc. for Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaflen. The initials FK refer to the English edition Faith and Knowledge. (Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: Faith and Knowledge. Ed. by W. Cerf and H. S. Harris. Albany, NY 1977.) Though I disagree from time to time with this English translation, it is certainly the best translation of a Hegelian text I have seen
4. Compare: Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi: Ueber das Unternehmen des Kriticismus die Vernunft zu Verstande zu bringen und der Philosophie überhaupt eine neue Absicht zu geben. - In: Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi's Werke. Dritter Band. Leipzig 1816. 77. (Reprint: Darmstadt 1968.)
5. Béatrice Longuenesse: Kant and the Capacity to Judge. Sensibility and Discursivity in the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by C.T. Wolfe. Princeton 1998
6. Robert B. Pippin: Book Review of Béatrice Longuenesse, Kant et le pouvoir de judger: Sensibilité et discursivité dans l'Analytique transcendentale de la Critique de la raison pure. - In: The Journal of Philosophy. 94 (1997), 6, 322
7. - Compare also Allison: "But her claim of a generative function of the synthesis speciosa points to a more Fichtean picture [...] it is difficult to understand what remains of Kant's conception of sensibility as a distinct faculty with an apriori form". (Henry E. Allison: Where have all the Categories gone? Reflections on Longuenesse's Reading of Kant's Transcendental Deduction. - In: Inquiry 43. [2000] 75.)
8. And Sedgwick: "I find it sometimes difficult to resist the temptation to conclude that what motivates her argument [...] is the desire to narrow the gap between Kant and the later German idealists. Her claim, for example, that not merely our perception of space and time but the pure forms of space and time themselves are 'generated' by the 'effect of understanding on sensibility', brings to mind, as Robert Pippin has pointed out, the Fichtean effort to derive intuitions from concepts". (Sally Sedgwick: Longuenesse on Kant and the Priority of the Capacity to Judge. - In: Inquiry 43 [2000] 89.)
9. Jaakko Hintikka: On Kant's Notion of Intuition (Anschauung). - In: The First Critique: Reflections on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Ed. Penelhum and McIntosh. Belmont 1969.43
10. Michael Friedman has recently tried to build a bridge between both positions (Michael Friedman: Geometry, Construction, and Intuition in Kant and His Successors. - In: Between Logic and Intuition. Essays in Honor of Charles Parson. Ed. G. Sher and R. Tieszen. Cambridge 2000. 188.) by integrating an epistemological role of the immediacy of intuitions into Hintikka's logical approach
11. Pippin's interpretation of Hegel's idealism is picked up by John McDowell and its content is one of the essential claims of his own philosophy outlined in Mind and World. (John McDowell: Mind and World. Cambridge 1994. 44, 111.) My objections against Pippin's proposal, therefore, are aimed also at McDowell's position
12. For an introduction into the notions of functional states and their realizations see for example Ned Block's article "functionalism (2)" in: A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Ed. Samuel Guttenplan. Oxford 1994.323-332
13. Wilfrid Sellars: Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. - In: Science, Perception and Reality. Atascadero, Calif. 1963. 127-196
14. Michael Friedman: Reconsidering Logical Positivism. Cambridge 1999
15. Michael Friedman: Dynamics of Reason. The 1999 Kant Lectures at Stanford University. Stanford 2000
16. Michael Friedman: A Parting of the Ways. Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger. Chicago and La Salle 2001