Reliabilist justification (or knowledge) as a good truth-ratio

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 86, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 445-458

  Adler, Jonathan E ^a  

^a CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 60949205310     PISSN: 02790750     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2005.00236.x     Document Type: Article

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