Sensations, swatches, and speckled hens

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 84, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 371-383

  Fantl, Jeremy ^a   Howell, Robert ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 60949136702     PISSN: 02790750     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1046/j.1468-0114.2003.00179.x     Document Type: Article

References (13)

1. John McDowell (1998). Mind, Value, and Reality. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p. 389.
2. Daniel Dennett (1991). Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, p. 364.
3. Hilary Putnam (1999). The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body, and World. New York: Columbia University Press especially section 2, lecture 3, "Psychophysical Correlation", pp. 109-33.
4. Kelly Dean Jolley and Michael Watkins (1998). "What is it Like to be a Phenomenologist?," Philosophical Quarterly 48, pp. 204-209.
5. On the Persistence of Phenomenology." in T. Metzinger (ed.) Conscious Experience. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh, pp. 293-308.
6. Diana Raffman (1994). "Vagueness without Paradox," Philosophical Review 103, pp. 41-74.
7. David Armstrong (1968). A Materialist Theory of the Mind, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
8. F. C. Jackson and R. J. Pinkerton (1973). "On an Argument Against Sensory Items," Mind 82, pp. 269-272.
9. F. C. Jackson (1977). Perception: A Representative Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 115.
10. Evan Fales (1996) A Defense of the Given, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, especially pp. 73-75.
11. Roderick Chishohn's (1942), "The Problem of the Speckled Hen," Mind 51, pp. 368-373
12. Timothy Williamson's (1990) Identity and Discrimination, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, p. 60.
13. (2000) Knowledge and Its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press