What is it like to be a phenomenologist?

Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 48, Issue 191, 1998, Pages 204-209

  Jolley, Kelly Dean ^a   Watkins, Michael ^a  

^a AUBURN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547834914     PISSN: 00318094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9213.00094     Document Type: Note

References (9)

1. T. Nagel, 'What is it Like to be a Bat?', Philosophical Review, 83 (1974), pp. 435-50
2. S. Shoemaker, 'The Inverted Spectrum', Journal of Philosophy, 79 (1982), pp. 357-81
3. F. Jackson, 'Epiphenomenal Qualiai' The Philosophical Quarterly, 32 (1982), pp. 127-36
4. D. Raffman, 'On the Persistence of Phenomenology' (hereafter OPP), in T. Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1995), pp. 293-308
5. Defenders of this position include W. Lycan, 'What is the "Subjectivity" of the Mental?', in J. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. IV: Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind (Ataxcadero: Ridgeview, 1990), pp. 109-30
6. and 'A Limited Defense of Phenomenal Information', in Metzinger, pp. 243-58
7. B. Loar, 'Phenomenal States', in Tomberlin, pp. 81-108
8. 'Vagueness without Paradox', Philosophical Review, 103 (1994), pp. 41-74
9. This is a play on the title of David Lewis' paper 'What Experience Teaches', in W. Lycan (ed.), Mind and Cognition (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), pp. 499-519