Why do informal proofs conform to formal norms?

Foundations of Science

Volumn 14, Issue 1-2, 2009, Pages 9-26

  Azzouni, Jody ^a  

^a TUFTS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Logic; Mathematical proof; Meaning; Natural language; Reasoning

Indexed keywords

LOGIC; MATHEMATICAL PROOF; MEANING; NATURAL LANGUAGES; REASONING;

SOCIAL SCIENCES;

PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS;

EID: 60449104050     PISSN: 12331821     EISSN: 15728471     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10699-008-9144-9     Document Type: Article

References (20)

1. Azzouni J. (1994) Metaphysical myths, mathematical practice: The ontology and epistemology of the exact sciences. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
2. Azzouni J. (2000) Applying mathematics: An attempt to design a philosophical problem. The Monist 83: 209-227
3. Azzouni J. (2000) Stipulation, logic, and ontological independence. Philosophia Mathematica 8(3): 225-243
4. Azzouni J. (2004) The derivation-indicator view of mathematical practice. Philosophia Mathematica 12(3): 81-105
5. Azzouni J. (2005) Is there still a sense in which mathematics can have foundations?. In: Sica G.(eds) Essays on the foundations of mathematics and logic. Polimetrica, Milan, pp 9-47
6. Azzouni J. (2006) Tracking reason: Proof, consequence, and truth. Oxford University Press, Oxford
7. Azzouni J. (2008) The compulsion to believe: Logical inference and normativity. Protosociology 25: 69-88
8. Carston R. (2002) Thought and utterances: The pragmatics of explicit communication. Blackwell Publishing, Oxford
9. Church A. (1956) Introduction to mathematical logic (Vol. 1). Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J
10. Dehaene S. (1997) The number sense. Oxford University Press, Oxford
11. Hacking, I. (1973). Leibniz and Descartes: Proof and eternal truths. In His 2002 Historical ontology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 200-213.
12. Katz J.J. (1998) Realistic rationalism. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
13. Koslow A. (1992) A structuralist theory of logic. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
14. Kreisel G. (1969) The formalist-positivist doctrine of mathematical precision in the light of experience. L'Âge de la Science 3: 17-46
15. MacKenzie D. (2001) Mechanizing proof: Computing, risk, and trust. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
16. MacLane S., Birkhoff G. (1967) Algebra. The Macmillan Company, New York
17. Neale S. (1995) The philosophical significance of Gödel's slingshot. Mind 104: 763-825
18. Quine W.V. (1953) On what there is. In From a logical point of view, Cambridge
19. Rav Y. (1999) Why do we prove theorems?. Philosophia Mathematica 7(3): 5-41
20. Rav Y. (2007) A critique of a formalist-mechanist version of the justification of arguments in mathematicians' proof practices. Philosophia Mathematica 15(3): 291-320