Tracking Reason: Proof, Consequence, and Truth

Tracking Reason: Proof, Consequence, and Truth

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 1-256

  Azzouni, Jody ^a  

^a TUFTS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Analogues; Consequence; Logicians; Mathematical proof; Reason; Reasoning

Indexed keywords

EID: 36749037386     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195187137.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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