Local and global interactions in an evolutionary resource game

Computational Economics

Volumn 33, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 155-173

  Noailly, Joëlle ^a   Bergh, Jeroen C J M ^b,c,d,e   Withagen, Cees A ^f  

^a CPB NETHERLANDS BUREAU FOR ECONOMIC POLICY ANALYSIS   (Netherlands)

^b VU UNIVERSITY AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

^c VU University   (Netherlands)

^d INSTITUT DE CIÈNCIA I TECNOLOGIA AMBIENTALS   (Spain)

^e INSTITUCIÓ CATALANA DE RECERCA I ESTUDIS AVANÇATS ICREA   (Spain)

^f TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Common property; Cooperation; Evolutionary game theory; Global interactions; Local interactions; Social norms

Indexed keywords

EID: 59349092355     PISSN: 09277099     EISSN: 15729974     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10614-008-9154-2     Document Type: Article

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