Sour grapes, self-abnegation and character building: Non-responsibility and responsibility for self-induced preferences

Monist

Volumn 86, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 220-241

  Zimmerman, David ^a  

^a SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 58149508760     PISSN: 00269662     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5840/monist20038627     Document Type: Article

References (19)

1. Jon Elster, Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 117
2. William J. Talbott, "Intentional Self-Deception in a Single Coherent Self," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LV, no. 1 March (1995): 27-74
3. Alfred Mele, Self-Deception Unmasked (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002)
4. Jerry Fodor, The Modularity of Mind (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1983)
5. Georges Rey, "Towards a Computational Account of Akrasia and Self-Deception," in Rorty and McLaughlin, Perspectives on Self-Deception, pp. 264-98
6. J. M. Fischer, The Metaphysics of Free Will (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1994), chs. 7, 8
7. Amélie O. Rorty, "The Deceptive Self: Liars, Layers and Lairs," in Rorty and B. P. McLaughlin (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988), p. 25
8. Elster, Alchemies of Mind: Rationality and the Emotions (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1999), ch. 1
9. Luc Bovens, "Sour Grapes and Character Planning," Journal of Philosophy, LXXXIX, 2 (1992): 57-78
10. Elster's in Alchemies of the Mind (pp. 6-7, 8, 21-23, 33, 35 and 44)
11. David Zimmerman, "Making Do: Troubling Stoic Tendencies of an Otherwise Compelling Theory of Autonomy," Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 30 (2000): 25-54
12. A. O. Rorty, "The Deceptive Self," 11, 16
13. Elster, Sour Grapes, ch. 2
14. P. Griffiths, What Emotions Really Are (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997)
15. Donald Davidson, "Radical Interpretation," in Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 125-39
16. Steven Stich, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1983), pp. 53-60
17. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," in Quine, From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960)
18. Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1957)
19. D. Zimmerman, "Reason within Freedom: The Meta-Ethics of Autonomous Agency," unpublished manuscript