Institutional constraints on organizations: The case of Spanish car dealerships

Managerial and Decision Economics

Volumn 30, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 15-26

  Arruñada, Benito ^a   Vázquez, Luis ^b   Zanarone, Giorgio ^a  

^a UNIVERSITAT POMPEU FABRA   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SALAMANCA   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 58149481182     PISSN: 01436570     EISSN: 10991468     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/mde.1429     Document Type: Article

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