Why are out-of-body experiences interesting for philosophers?. The theoretical relevance of OBE research

Cortex

Volumn 45, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 256-258

  Metzinger, Thomas ^a,b,c  

^a JOHANNES GUTENBERG UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^b FRANKFURT INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES   (Germany)

^c Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; BODY IMAGE; CONSCIOUSNESS; HALLUCINATION; METAPHYSICS; NEUROSCIENCE; OUT OF BODY EXPERIENCE; PERSONAL EXPERIENCE; SELF CONCEPT; SOCIAL BELIEF; SOMATOSENSORY SYSTEM;

EID: 58149474130     PISSN: 00109452     EISSN: 00109452     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.cortex.2008.09.004     Document Type: Note

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