Financing homeland security and emergency preparedness: Use of interlocal cost-sharing

Public Budgeting and Finance

Volumn 28, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 48-68

  Macmanus, Susan A ^a   Caruson, Kiki ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 57749138883     PISSN: 02751100     EISSN: 15405850     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5850.2008.00905.x     Document Type: Article

References (91)

1. Same state studies are a useful way to control for "the influence of variations in state laws, state political culture, state economies, and a number of other factors that would be nearly impossible to capture in a multi-state analysis" (Kelly LeRoux and Jered B. Carr, "Explaining Local Government Cooperation on Public Works: Evidence From Michigan." Political Science Working Group on Interlocal Services Cooperation, Wayne State University, 2007; available from: http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/interlocal.coop/26): accessed 15 March 2007.
2. Kiki Caruson and Susan A. MacManus, "Funding Homeland Security and Hurricane Preparedness: Florida's Local Governments Face Formidable Fiscal Pressures," Municipal Finance Journal 27, no. 2 (2006a): 75-93.
3. This chapter, titled Intergovernmental Programs, is broken into six parts: Part I: Miscellaneous ProgramsFFlorida Interlocal Cooperation Act of 1969; councils of local public officials; Secretary of Community AffairsFpowers and duties, function of the Department of Community Affairs with respect to federal grant-in-aid programs; energy devices based on renewable resources; small county technical assistance program; local government financial technical assistance program; Miami River Commission; efficiency and accountability in local government services; Part II: Growth Policy; County and Municipal Planning; Land Development Regulation; Part III: Community Redevelopment; Part IV: Neighborhood Improvement Districts; Part V: Regional Transportation Authorities; Part VI: Collaborative Client Information Systems.
4. Municipal Research and Services Center of Washington, "Interlocal Agreements" in Municipal Cooperation Guide, MRSC Report no. 27 (September 1993): 1.
5. Skip Krueger and Michael McGuire, "A Transaction Costs Explanation of Interlocal Government Collaboration," Paper presented at the Eighth National Public Management Research Conference (Los Angeles, September 29-October 1, 2005): 1.
6. These survey questions concerning local cost-sharing agreements appeared in a section labeled "Budget" of a mail survey administered by the authors in the fall/winter of 2005-2006. Each question in the Budget section was finance-related making it absolutely clear that interlocal cost-sharing was directly financial in nature.
7. The survey instrument is available upon request from the authors.
8. Scott Collins, "Interlocal Service-Sharing Agreements," ICMA IQ Report 38, no. 3 (2006): 2.
9. LeRoux and Carr (2007);
10. Kelly LeRoux, "The Role of Structure, Function, and Networks in Explaining Interlocal Services Delivery: A Study of Institutional Cooperation in Michigan," Ph.D. Dissertation, Wayne State University, 2006;
11. Eric A. Scorsone, "The Distributional Consequences of Interlocal Agreement Cost Allocation Strategies," Political Science Working Group on Interlocal Services Cooperation, Wayne State University, 2006; available from: http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/interlocal.coop/17
12. Elisabeth R. Gerber and Clark C. Gibson, "Cooperative Municipal Services: A Political Economy Framework for Understanding Intergovernmental Cooperation," Working Group on Interlocal Services Cooperation, Wayne State University, 2005; available from: http://digitalcommons.way.edu/interlocal_coop/
13. Arthur William Holdsworth and the Intergovernmental Cooperation Committee of the MGFOA, "The Case For Interlocal Cooperation," Government Finance Review (2007): 40-46;
14. Collins (2006);
15. Krueger and McGuire (2005);
16. Kenneth Bickers, "The Politics of Interlocal Cooperation: A Theory and a Test," Political Science Working Group on Interlocal Services Cooperation, Wayne State University, 2005; available from: http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/interlocal_coop/1xx.
17. David W. Russell, Brian E. West, and Richard Van Ausdall, "Cooperative Ventures by Local Governments in Connecticut," Hartford, CT: Connecticut Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, July 11, 2003.
18. Holdsworth, 40-46.
19. Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP), "A Framework for Assessing Regional Preparedness: A White Paper on Applying Emergency Preparedness Standards to Multijurisdictional Areas," April 2006: 3.
20. Holdsworth, 40-46;
21. EMAP, 3;
22. Soji Adelaja and Laila A. Racevskis, "Cooperation Costs and the Economics of Intergovernmental Partnerships," Political Science Working Group on Interlocal Services Cooperation, Wayne State University 2005; available from: http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/interlocal_coop/18
23. Krueger and McGuire (2005).
24. John L. Mikesell, "Chapter 14: Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations: Diversity and Coordination," in Fiscal Administration: Analysis and Applications for the Public Sector, 6th ed. (Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2003).
25. Holdsworth, 42.
26. Collins (2006);
27. J.R. Bartle and R. Swayze, Interlocal Cooperation in Nebraska. Unpublished report prepared for the Nebraska Mandates Management Initiative, 1997;
28. Robert Stein, "Urban Alternatives: Public and Private Markets in the Provision of Local Services" (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990);
29. Curtis Wood, "Scope and Patterns of Metropolitan Governance in Urban America: Probing the Complexities in the Kansas City Region," American Review of Public Administration 36 (2006): 337-353;
30. LeRoux and Carr, 2007.
31. Adelaja and RacHvskis (2005): 3-4; available from: http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/interlocal_coop/18
32. Kiki Caruson and Susan A. MacManus, "Homeland Security Preparedness: Federal and State Mandates Unevenly Affect Local Government Readiness," Spectrum: The Journal of State Governments 78 (2005): 25-28.
33. Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations, Intergovernmental Service Arrangements for Delivering Local Public Services (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1985);
34. David R. Morgan and Michael W. Hirlinger, "Intergovernmental Service Contracts: A Multivariate Explanation," Urban Affairs Quarterly 27, no. 1 (1991): 128-144;
35. Stein (1990).
36. Gibbons and Miller (2007);
37. Holdsworth (2007);
38. Caruson and MacManus (2006a).
39. LeRoux and Carr (2007:5)
40. Leroux (2006)
41. Majoj Shrestha and Richard Feoick, "The Network Structure of Interlocal Cooperation for Water Related Services," Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 20-23, 2006.
42. Wallace E. Oates, "Fiscal Structure in the Federal System," in Management Policies in Local Government Finance, eds. J. Richard Aronson and Eli Schwartz, 5th ed. (Washington, DC: International City/County Management Association, 2004): 39-60;
43. Paul L. Posner, "Homeland Security: Reforming Federal Grants to Better Meet Outstanding Needs," Washington, DC: US General Accounting Office, 2003;
44. Caruson and MacManus (2006a).
45. LeRoux and Carr (2007:9)
46. LeRoux (2006).
47. Wood (2006);
48. Kurt Thurmaier and Curtis Wood, "Interlocal Agreements as Overlapping Social Networks: Picket-Fence Regionalism in Metropolitan Kansas City," Public Administration Review 62 (2002), 585-596.
49. Russell, West, and Ausdall (2003):9.
50. Scorsone (2006).
51. Caruson and MacManus (2006a);
52. Kiki Caruson and Susan A. MacManus, "Mandates and Management Challenges in the Trenches: An Intergovernmental Perspective of Homeland Security," Public Administration Review 66, no. 4 (2006b): 522-536.
53. Roger L. Kemp, "Regional Government Innovations: A Handbook for Citizens and Public Officials," (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2003);
54. U.S. Government Accountability Office, "Effective Regional Coordination Can Enhance Emergency Preparedness (Washington, DC, 2004): GAO-04-1009.
55. Holdsworth (2007):41.
56. LeRoux and Carr (2007);
57. Richard C. Feiock, "Introduction: Regionalism and Institutional Collective Action," in Metropolitan Governance: Conflict, Competition, and Cooperation, ed. Richard Feoick (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004).
58. Richard D. Barazine, "Contracting Law Enforcement Services," IQ Report 34 (February 2002);
59. Simon A. Andrew, "Interlocal Contractual Arrangements in the Provision of Public Safety," Political Science Working Group on Interlocal Services Cooperation, Wayne State University, 2005; available from: http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/interlocal_coop/
60. Council of State Governments, "Regional Solutions for Enhanced Public Safety (Lexington, KY: COSGOV, 2005).
61. During the week of October 28, 2005, mail surveys were sent to 408 city finance officials and 67 county finance officials. The initial survey mailing included a stamped self-addressed envelope. A follow-up mailing occurred during the week of December 2, 2005.
62. Population size is the single variable by which we can gauge sample representativeness because a population category question was asked on the survey. We were not able to match Census data with surveys because we did not ask respondents to report the name of their jurisdiction. In fact we promised survey respondents anonymityFa practice that increases response rates especially on sensitive subjects. Population size is also the most common variable used by city and county associations to classify and compare cities and counties in Florida. Overall, Florida has considerably more small than large municipalities. Among the state's 406 cities, 363 (89 percent) are under 50,000, and 325 (80 percent) are under 25,000 population. Among our municipal respondents, 87 percent (n5161) represent small jurisdictions (populations under 50,000) and only 13 percent (n525) cities over 50,000 for a total of 186 city surveys. Among Florida's 67 counties, 36 (54 percent) have populations of at least 50,000. Among our county survey respondents, only 21 percent (n58) represent small counties (populations under 50,000) and 79 percent (n530) represent large counties (populations over 50,000) for a total of 38 county surveys.
63. Specifically, the survey asks: "Has your government entered into any formal emergency management- related cost-sharing agreements with any other local government entities? Yes, No, or Not yet, but we're planning to." If a respondent answered yes to the previous question, he or she was asked to identify the type of local government that his or her jurisdiction has partnered with: County, municipality, and/or a special district. Respondents were also asked to identify whether their cost-sharing agreements are homeland security specific, natural disaster specific, or emergency management in general.
64. Tourism alone dropped almost 19 percent in the months following 9/11 (Susan A. MacManus, "Political Insight Web Log: Election 2004" (January 2004-January 2005). Tampa Bay Online; available from: http://tbo.com/weblogs/weblogmacmanus.shtml).
65. Susan A. MacManus, "Florida: The South's Premier Battleground State," American Review of Politics 26 (2005): 155-184.
66. Florida State's Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (Tallahassee, FL: State of Florida, 2004): 8.
67. Kiki Caruson, Susan A. MacManus, Matthew Kohen, and Thomas A. Watson, "Homeland Security Preparedness: The Rebirth of Regionalism," Publius 35 (2005): 143-168.
68. This headline ran in the Ft. Myers News-Press on November 30, 2005Fthe last day of the 2005 hurricane season; available from: www.news-press.com/apps/pbcs.d11/article?AID=/20051130/WEATHER01/ 511300442/10.
69. Sharon Binnun, "Solvency and Capacity Overview," Office of Insurance Regulation, State of Florida, November 14, 2005.
70. "Bush Asks President for Hurricane Relief," Jacksonville Business Journal; available from: http://jacksonville.bizjournals.com/ jacksonville/stories/2004/10/04/daily18.html; accessed 6 October 2004.
71. Of these 38 percent, 73 percent are already engaged in a cost-sharing agreement; 27 percent plan to be.
72. International City/County Management Association (ICMA), "Reinventing Government Implementation at the Local Level," ICMA 2003, available from: http://icma.org/upload/bc/attach/ {6CD4799FOE32-4981-8A00-C6744B246189}rlg2003web.pdf, 1-3.
73. Collins (2006), 2.
74. Jurisdiction type is not a statistically important predictor of the likelihood of cost-sharing engagement.
75. We performed a logit analysis that did show the signs of the expected relationships to be in the hypothesized direction.
76. Louis M. Rea and Richard Parker, Designing and Conducting Survey Research: A Comprehensive Guide, 2nd ed. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1996).
77. Megan Mullin, "Do Special Districts Act Alone?: Exploring the Relationship between Flexible Boundaries and Intergovernmental Cooperation," Political Science Working Group on Interlocal Services Cooperation, Wayne State University, 2007, 1-30;
78. available from: http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/interlocal.coop/27. Mullin lays out the arguments: On the one hand, special districts may promote regional cooperation. "They allow boundary design to the scale of public problems and may produce greater efficiency in the marketplace for local public goods." The flexibility of special district boundaries once established "allows for governance that is more adaptable to changing resource constraints and patterns of demand." On the other, "While special districts may be more adaptable in design, they also contribute to fragmentation of local authority and the concomitant challenges of coordinating policy action across multiple jurisdictions."
79. There is a multiplicity of possible explanations for this finding. One is that local governments in good fiscal health bring more to the table in terms of fiscal resources than their counterparts who are in financial troubleFthose who reported a fair-to-poor overall financial condition. Another is that they are larger and more likely to receive pass-through federal or state funds, which, in turn, they must share among smaller local governmental entities. We do not have the data to test these hypotheses. However, our data do not show a significant relationship between population size and fiscal condition.
80. Of the 69 percent of respondents who report that they have not received a fair share of federal homeland security funds or have declined to apply for them, 31 percent believe they have not received a fair share of the federal pie while 38 percent have declined to even apply for federal funds. Of the 73 percent of jurisdictions who report that they have not received a fair share of state homeland security funds or have declined to apply for them, 25 percent believe they have not received a fair share of the federal pie while 48 percent have declined to even apply for state funds. By population size, larger jurisdictions are more likely to believe they have not received a fair share of either federal or state funds while small jurisdictions are more likely to report that they have yet to apply for either type of funding.
81. Kiki Caruson and Susan A. MacManus, "Structuring Homeland Security Grants: Florida's Local Finance Officials Evaluate The Funding Process," Journal of Public Finance and Management 7, no. 2 (2007): 1-14.
82. Collins (2006), 5.
83. No history of interlocal service-sharing agreements; previous bad relationships with neighbors, lack of trust; competition for economic development leading to adversarial relationship; belief in self-interest maximization, prompting suspicion of the motives of neighboring jurisdictions; fear of creating dependency on neighbors (Collins, 2006: 5).
84. Desire for local control of services; perception that service levels will be reduced; possibility of inequitable or unfair distribution of services; loss of accountability and responsiveness.
85. Ibid.
86. Perceived loss of standing, pay; suspicion of managerial motives in pursuit of service-sharing agreement; belief that agreement will result in staff cuts; heightened discomfort with a new way of doing things; expectation of just another management fad; lack of leadership or champions.
87. Ibid.
88. High transaction costs; resource, time, and energy constraints; bureaucratic red tape and inflexibility preventing novel approaches to service delivery; lack of staff, technical, and/or local expertise to facilitate and administer agreements.
89. Ibid.
90. Caruson and MacManus (2005).
91. It is not that there is a shortage of special districts in Florida. There are literally thousands covering a wide range of activities and policy areas.