Is knowing-how simply a case of knowing-that?

Philosophical Investigations

Volumn 27, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 370-379

  Rosefeldt, Tobias ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34548594173     PISSN: 01900536     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9205.2004.00232.x     Document Type: Article

References (5)

1. Cf. 'Knowing How'; in: The Journal of Philosophy (98) 2001, p. 411-444
2. 'Knowing How and Knowing That'; in: Collected Papers, Volume 2 (New York: Barnes and Nobles, 1971), pp. 212-25, p. 215
3. Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, Chicago: University Press 1949, p. 29
4. Calling the argument for first-personal modes of presentation an 'existence proof' is an exaggeration. We could also distinguish (3) and (4) by saying that according to (3) John self-ascribes the property of living in a world in which that man has burning pants, while according to (4) he self-ascribes the property of having burning pants (cf. David Lewis, 'Attitudes De Dicto and De Se'; in: Philosophical Review 88 (1979), pp. 513-543)
5. Cf. Gilbert Ryle, Der Begriff des Geistes, Übersetzung von Kurt Baier (überarbeitet von Günther Patzig und Ulrich Steinvorth), Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun. 1969 (Überarbeitung 1997)