Reproductive autonomy, the non-identity problem, and the non-person problem

Bioethics

Volumn 23, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 59-67

  DiSilvestro, Russell ^a  

^a CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Capacities; Genetic therapy; Non Identity Problem; Personhood; Reproductive autonomy; Wronging

Indexed keywords

CHILD ADVOCACY; DECISION MAKING; ETHICAL THEORY; ETHICS; GENETIC SCREENING; HUMAN; MATERNAL CARE; MENTAL CAPACITY; MORALITY; NEWBORN; PARENT; PERSONAL AUTONOMY; PERSONHOOD; REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS; REVIEW; WRONGFUL LIFE;

CHILD ADVOCACY; DECISION MAKING; ETHICAL ANALYSIS; ETHICAL THEORY; GENETIC SCREENING; HUMANS; INFANT, NEWBORN; MENTAL COMPETENCY; MORALS; PARENTS; PERSONAL AUTONOMY; PERSONHOOD; PRECONCEPTION CARE; REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS; WRONGFUL LIFE;

EID: 57649234984     PISSN: 02699702     EISSN: 14678519     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2008.00681.x     Document Type: Review

References (22)

1. D. Parfit. 1984. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 359.
2. A. Buchanan et al. 2000. From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
3. See also Parfit, From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice. note 2.
4. R. Kumar. Who Can Be Wronged? Philos Public Aff 2003 31 : 99-118 : 105.
5. T.M. Scanlon. 1998. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
6. Kumar, What We Owe to Each Other. note 4, pp. 113-114.
7. Kumar, What We Owe to Each Other, Ibid: 112.
8. Kumar, What We Owe to Each Other, Ibid: 107.
9. Kumar, What We Owe to Each Other, Ibid: 111.
10. Kumar, What We Owe to Each Other, Ibid: 113.
11. Recent views similar to one sketched in the next few paragraphs can be found in E. Olson. 1997. The Human Animal: Personal Identity without Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 85-89
12. M. Nussbaum. Capabilities and Human Rights. Fordham Law Rev 1997 66 : 273 300
13. J.P. Moreland & S.B. Rae. 2000. Body and Soul: Human Nature and the Crisis in Ethics. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press: 71-73.
14. D.M. Armstrong, C.B. Martin & U.T. Place. 1996. Dispositions: A Debate, ed. T. Crane. New York: Routledge
15. G. Molnar. 2003. Powers: A Study in Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press
16. S. Mumford. 1998. Dispositions. Oxford: Oxford University Press
17. E. Prior. Dispositions. 1985. Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press.
18. J. McMahan. 2002. The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
19. E. Olson, The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life. note 10.
20. D. DeGrazia. 2005. Human Identity and Bioethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
21. R. DiSilvestro. A Qualified Endorsement of Embryonic Stem Cell Research, Based On Two Widely Shared Beliefs about the Brain-Diseased Patients Such Research Might Benefit. J Med Ethics (forthcoming in 2008).
22. Although it has not been explicitly argued in the paper, it is not hard to see why fetuses and embryos will count as persons. But this leaves open the question of whether killing them is always morally wrong.