Enemy combatants versus enemy criminal law: An introduction to the european debate regarding enemy criminal law and its relevance to the anglo-American discussion on the legal status of unlawful enemy combatants

New Criminal Law Review

Volumn 11, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 529-562

  Díez, Carlos Gómez Jara ^a  

^a UNIVERSIDAD AUTÓNOMA DE MADRID   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 57649115488     PISSN: 19334192     EISSN: 19334206     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1525/nclr.2008.11.4.529     Document Type: Editorial

References (191)

1. See Legal Times, November 22, 2002.
2. See also for an introduction George Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law: The Universal Part §3.4 (available at www.law.upenn. edu/fac/npersily/Fletcher.pdf) (stating that "'[c]riminal law against enemies' seeks to get rid of or at least neutralize the offender").
3. Despite recent efforts made by the Legislature, the Courts, and the Academia, the actual definition of who may be considered as an enemy combatant still needs further clarification. See Allison M. Danner, Defining Unlawful Enemy Combatants: A Centripetal Story, 43 Tex. Int'l L.J. 1 (2007) (arguing that "that the idea of enemy combatant oscillates uneasily between the poles of war and crime and international and domestic law. These tensions have resulted in a concept whose plasticity renders it unhelpful as a tool for legal regulation and whose indeterminacy vests vast discretion in the Executive")
4. Jason Binimow, Designation as Unlawful Enemy Combatant, 185 A.L.R. Fed. 475 (2003)
5. Jonathan L. Hafetz, The Supreme Court's "Enemy Combatant; Decisions: Recognizing the Rights of Non-Citizens and the Rule of Law, 14 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 409 (2006)
6. Peter Jan Honisberg, Chasing "Enemy Combatants" and Circumventing International Law: A License for Sanctioned Abuse, 12 UCLA J. Int'l L. & Foreign Aff. 1 (2007) (focusing on the specific evolution and chronology of the term "enemy combatant" and the administration's inconsistent definitions).
7. Regarding the due process issues faced by the enemy combatant status, see Tung Yin, Procedural Due Process to Determine Enemy Combatant Status in the War on Terrorism, 73 Tenn. L. Rev. 351 (2006).
8. See also Juliet Stumpf, Citizens of an Enemy Land: Enemy Combatants, Aliens, and the Constitutional Rights of the Pseudo-Citizen, 38 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 79 (2004)
9. Terry Gill and Elies van Sliedregt, Guantánamo Bay: A Reflection on the Legal Status and Rights of "Unlawful Enemy Combatants," 1 Utrecht L. Rev. 1 (2005) (available at http://www.utrechtlawreview.org).
10. As Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 Yale L.J. 1029 (2004) at 1030, puts it: "This is a challenge confronting all liberal democracies, and we should not allow American particularities to divert attention from the general features of our problem in institutional design."
11. See Günther Jakobs, Estudios Derecho Penal (1997)
12. Jakobs, Derecho penal del ciudadano y Derecho penal del enemigo, Derecho Penal Del Enemigo 21, 57 (Günther Jakobs & Manuel Cancio Meliá, 2d ed., 2006) [hereinafter Jakobs, Enemigo, supra note 5];
13. Jakobs, Dogmática de Derecho Penal y la Configuración Normativa de la Sociedad 42 (2004) [hereinafter Jakobs, Dogmática, supra note 5];
14. Jakobs, Staatliche Strafe, Bedeuting En Zweck 40 (2004) [hereinafter Jakobs, Staatliche Strafe, supra note 5];
15. Jakobs, D¿erecho penal del enemigo? Un estudio acerca de los presupuestos de la juricidad in 2 Derecho Penal Del Enemigo: El discurso penal de la exclusión 93 (Manuel Cancio Meliá & Carlos Gómez-Jara Díez eds., 2006) [hereinafter, Jakobs, Presupuestos, supra note 5].
16. For an outline of Jakobs's criminal law theory, see Jakobs, Imputation in Criminal Law and the Conditions for Norm Validity, 7 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 490 (2004).
17. For an introduction see contributions contained in 2 Derecho Penal Del Enemigo: El discurso penal de la exclusión 93 (Manuel Cancio Meliá & Carlos Gómez-Jara Díez eds., 2006)
18. and Bitte Bewahren Sie Ruhe: Leben im Feindrechtsstaat (Thomas Uwer ed., 2006).
19. See also the following works: Alejandro Aponte, Kreig und Feindstrafrecht: Uberlegungen Zum Effizienten Feindstraftecht Anhand Der Situation in Kolumbein (2004)
20. Manuel Cancio Meliá, "Derecho penal" del enemigo? in Derecho Penal Del Enemigo at 86 (Günther Jakobs and Manuel Cancio Meliá eds., 2d ed. 2006)
21. Luis Gracia Martin, El Horizonte Del Finalismo y El Derecho Penal Del Enemigo (2005)
22. Francisco Muñoz Conde, De Nuevo Sobre El Derecho Penal Del Enemigo (2005)
23. Miguel Polaino-Orts, Derecho Penal Del enemigo, Desmitificación De un Concepto (2006).
24. See generally on the logic of distinctions Rodrigo Jokisch, Logik Der Distinktionen Zur Protologik Einer Theorie Der Gesellschaft (1996).
25. See also Luis Chiesa, Outsiders Looking In: The American Legal Discourse of Exclusion, forthcoming in Rutgers Journal of Law and Public Policy (exploring the implications of certain distinctions in the American legal discourse).
26. In any event, the inclusion/exclusion distinction that the enemy/citizen criminal law distinction reflects brings the powerful logic of exclusion into the scene (on the logic of exclusion see introductorily William Rasch, Niklas Luhmann's Modernity: The Paradoxes of Differentiation at 108 (2000)).
27. Regarding the current standing in Spain see Polaino-Orts, supra note 6, at 51
28. Múñoz Conde, supra note 6, at 39
29. in Germany Tatjana Hörnle, Deskriptive und normative Dimensionen des Begriffs Feindstrafrecht GA 80 (2006)
30. Roland Hefendehl, Organisierte Kriminalitär als Begründung für ein Feind-oder Täterstrafrecht, StV 156 (2005)
31. Michael Pawlik, §14 Abs. 3 des Luftsicherheitsgesetzes - ein Tabubruch?, JZ 1045 (2004)
32. Sinn, Tötung Unschuldiger auf Grund §14 III Luftsicherheitsgesetz - rechtmässig?, NStZ 585 (2004)
33. Aponte, supra note 6, at 305. In any event, every legal system with criminal provisions regarding organized crime, drug trafficking, illegal immigration or terrorism uses constantly enemy criminal law.
34. See Cornelius Prittwitz, Derecho penal del enemigo: A¿nálisis critico o programa del Derecho penal?, La Politica criminal En Europa 110 (2004)
35. Kai Ambos, Feindstrafrecht ZStR 1 (2006)
36. Luis Greco, Über das so gennante Feindstrafrecht GA 96 (2006).
37. In the opposite direction, i.e., no disruption between both positions of the German professor, see Polaino-Orts, supra note 6, at 46-47.
38. Synthesizing the discussion, see Hörnle, supra note 8.
39. Summarizing this point, main features of enemy criminal law are, as noted before, (1) punishing well in advance of a harm being caused; (2) disproportionate, i.e., extremely high, imprisonment sanctions; (3) suppressing procedural rights. See Jakobs, Dogmática, supra note 5, at 43
40. Cancio Meliá, supra note 6, at 112 with further references.
41. To get a taste of this matter, see Schünemann's asseverations in Bernd Schünemann, Ein Gespenst geht um in Europa - Brüsseler "Strafrechtspflege" intra muros-, GA 511 (2002) (regarding the primacy of German systematic thinking over the functional approach of other traditions)
42. see arguments against such considerations in Joachim Vogel, Europäische Kriminalpolitik-europäische Strafrechtsdogmatik GA at 523 (2002).
43. See among others Bernd Schünemann, Feindstrafrecht ist kein Strafrecht, Festschrift für Kay Nehm 175 (Brandner et al. eds., 2006)
44. Ulfrid Neumann, Feindstrafrecht, Bitte Bewahren Sie Ruhe: Leben in Feindrechsstaat 299 (Thomas Uwer ed., 2006)
45. Friedrich Sack, Feinstrafrecht-Iuf Dem Weg Zu Einer Anderen Kriminalpolitik (2005)
46. Peter-Alexis Albrecht, "Krieg gegen den Terror" Konsequenzen für ein rechtsstaatliches Straftecht 117 ZStW 855 (2005)
47. Peter-Alexis Albrecht, Das Nach-Praventive Strafrecht: Abschied Von Recht (2006). It should be noted that Schünemann has recently rectified his prior position as to the nature of enemy criminal law. At first he was of the opinion that criminal provisions had to do with citizens' freedom and that criminal law "distinguished between free citizens and society's enemies who should be imprisoned to a greater or lesser extent" (Bernd Schünemann, Europäische Haftbefehl und gegenseitige Anerkennung in Strafsachen ZRP 188 (2003)
48. Schünemann, Die parlamentarische Gesetzgebung als Lakai von Brussel? Zum Entwurf des Europäischen Haftbefehlgesetzes StV 120 (2003)). This was due to the fact that "according to its nature and when dealing with imprisonment sanctions, criminal law is always enemy criminal law. Therefore we need the greatest guarantees available before enacting any such provisions" [Schünemann, Haftbefehl 188
49. Schünemann, Lakai 120
50. see also Schünemann, Die deutsche Strafrechtswissenschaft nach der Jahrtausendwend GA 205 (2001)]. He went on to say that Jakobs's distinction between enemy and citizen criminal "fails to acknowledge that every offender is treated as an enemy of society and that greater sanctions for greater crimes always imply greater guarantees" [Schünemann, Fortschritte und Fehltritte in der Europäisierung der Strafrechtspflege, GA 201 n.49 (2004)]. Consequently he predicted that the enemy criminal law category was "dangerous and doomed to failure" [Schünemann, Das Strafrecht im Zeichen der Globalisierung GA 313 (2003)]. Yet, recently he stated [Schünemann, Feindstrafrecht, 176] that "I have to acknowledge that after Jakobs's indepth analysis of the enemy criminal law concept, I do have to revise my prior opinion as to the non-sense of distinguishing between enemy and citizen criminal law."
51. The question as to whether the label "enemy criminal law" may be regarded as fortunate or unfortunate depends on how the concept is used: if it is used for describing a certain state of affairs of modern criminal legislation, then it seems adequate to assign to the concept a negative connotation so that every time the concept is used for describing a certain regulation, immediately a negative meaning will appear for that concrete piece of legislation. To the contrary, if a certain legitimacy is sought within the concept, negative connotations are not welcome anymore. See Jakobs, Enemigo, supra note 5, at 22 (stating that the label "enemy criminal law" is not intended to be pejorative). Following the same thought,
52. see Michael Pawlik, Strafe oder Gefahrenbekämpfung? Die Prinzipien des deutschen internationalen Strafrechts vor der Forum der Straftheorie ZIS, n.122 (2006)
53. Polaino-Orts, supra note 6, at 95-96. We must, however, contend that what deserves some criticism is the link between a nonpejorative meaning of enemy criminal law and the "right to security": "Whoever does not provide sufficient cognitive reassurance of a law-abiding behavior, not only cannot expect to be treated as a person by the State, but the State itself should not treat him as such, because if it does so, the State would be harming the right to security to which other persons are entitled. Hence it would be a terrible mistake to demonize what we are calling here 'enemy criminal law"' (Jakobs, Enemigo, supra note 5, at 22).
54. See the title of Eduardo Demetrio Crespo's work - "enemy criminal law should not exist": El Derecho penal del enemigo darf nicht sein! Sobre la ilegitimidad del llamado "Derecho penal del enemigo" y la idea de la seguridad, in Derecho Penal Del Enemigo, El discurso penal de la exclusión 473 (Manuel Cancio Meliá & Carlos Gómez-Jara Díez eds., 2006).
55. See Manuel Cancio Meliá, Derecho Penal Del Enemigo, supra note 6, at 89, 124.
56. For an outline of Cancio's criminal law theory, see Cancio, Victim Behavior and Offender Liability: A European Perspective, 7 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 512 (2004)
57. in a similar sense, see Schünemann, Feindstrafrecht, supra note 13, at 175 (stating that enemy criminal law is by no means criminal law).
58. In any case, it must be noted that Jakobs himself shows some doubts as to the question of whether enemy criminal law qualifies as "law" (see Jakobs, Dogmática, supra note 5, at 43: "Enemy criminal law follows different rules than a criminal law based on the State of Law and it is not clear yet whether the former reveals itself as truly law."
59. Because of this he contends that "the word 'law' has two different meanings depending on whether it is used in citizen or enemy criminal law" (see Jakobs, Enemigo, supra note 5, at 26).
60. The first step toward considering that enemy criminal law is actually "law" is the fact that we are dealing with a certain rules-oriented reaction and it is not merely spontaneous and disorderly (see Jakobs, Enemigo, supra note 5, at 24: "enemy criminal law implies at least a behavior according to some rules, and not a spontaneous and disorderly conduct"). The second more relevant step is that enemy criminal law is based upon a fundamental "right to security" (Recht auf Sicherheit that is acknowledged to regular citizens and generates the corresponding "protection duty" (Schutzpflicht) by the State.
61. See Jakobs, Presupuestos, supra note 5, at 114
62. further references to this question are contained in Jakobs, Enemigo, supra note 5, at 33-34, 75. According to Jakobs, "We refer to 'law' as a connection between persons holding rights and duties, whereas the relationship with an enemy is not determined by law, but by coercion. However, law is always linked to the authorization to use coercion, criminal law being the strongest. Therefore, one could argue that every single criminal sanction, even every self-defense, is directed towards an enemy."
63. Jakobs, Enemigo, supra note 5, at 34.
64. Jakobs, Enemigo, supra note 5, at 42: "what must be done against terrorists if we do not want to succumb."
65. In a similar way Jesus Silva Sánchez, La Expansión del Derecho Penal 163 (2d ed. 2001) states: Terrorism threatens to "undermine the foundations of our society and our State."
66. The American reader will surely identify in this matter the heated discussion taking place as to whether the Constitution may be regarded as a "suicide pact" or not (see, among others, Saikrishna Prakash, The Constitution as Suicide Pact, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1299 (2004)
67. Richard Posner, Not a Suicide Pact, The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency (2006)
68. and David Cole's review in David Cole, The Poverty of Posner's Pragmatism: Balancing Away Liberty after 9/11, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 1735 (2007)).
69. See also for different perspectives on this issue Bruce Ackerman, Before the Next Attack. Preserving Civil Liberties in an Age of Terrorism 77-101 (2006) [hereinafter Ackerman, Before the Next Attack, supra note 19];
70. Ackerman, supra note 4
71. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1257 (2004)
72. Mark Tushnet, The Political Constitution of Emergency Powers: Some Lessons from Hamdan, 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1451 (2007)
73. Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Norms in a State of Permanent Emergency, 40 Ga. L. Rev. 699 (2006)
74. Kevin Jon Heller, The Rhetoric of Necessity (Or, Sanford Levinson's Pinteresque Conversation), 40 Ga. L. Rev. 779 (2006).
75. Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract ([1762] 2007).
76. Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Foundations of Natural Right ([1796-97] 2000).
77. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan Ch. 28 ([1651] 1982).
78. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals ([1785] 1996).
79. Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace ([1795] 2007).
80. Id. at 25.
81. Id. at 13.
82. For a U.S. perspective on this matter, see Emanuel Gross, Thwarting Terrorist Acts by Attacking the Perpetrators or Their Commanders as an Act of Self-Defense: Human Rights versus the State's Duty to Protect Its Citizens, 15 Temp. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 195 (2001). It should be noted that deep down inside enemy criminal law is actually a State mechanism of self-protection, and daily practices just confirm this insight. Nonetheless two nuances: First, the paradox entailed in enemy criminal law reflects the paradox of a State willing to secure its own existence through enemy criminal law though actually threatening its very own existence. Second, Jakobs does not pretend to secure legal constructions per se, but only to the extent that these legal constructions provide guidance for the people. Put otherwise: Enemy criminal law does not appear in a society in which no individual obeys the law, but in those societies in which some comply with it and others are careless about it.
83. This type of distinction between two standards of criminal law has been heavily criticized by leading academic David Cole under the double-standard argument (see Cole, Enemy Aliens: Double Standards and Constitutional Freedoms in the War on Terrorism (2003) [hereinafter Cole, Enemy Aliens: Double Standards, supra note 28];
84. Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 953 (2002) [hereinafter Cole, Enemy Aliens, supra note 28] stating that though some may argue that a "double standard" for citizens and noncitizens is perfectly justified, in his view it is normatively and constitutionally wrong, because it undermines our security interests and it will pave the way for future inroads on citizens' liberties.
85. Jakobs, Dogmática, supra note 5, at 43.
86. Niklas Luhmann, Law as a Social System 56 (2004).
87. Another way to express this thinking is to refer to a meaning dimension and a nature dimension. In any case, this second dimension consists basically of indications about nature, and not nature itself. Every communication takes place in the meaning dimension, i.e., meaning is the means for every communication. Nature dimension is only a meaning dimension about nature.
88. Günther Jakobs, Sobre la Teoria de la Pena 25-26 (1998)
89. Jakobs, Sobre la Normativización de la Dogmática Jurídico-Penal 52 (2003) [hereinafter Jakobs, Normativización, supra note 32].
90. Jakobs, Dogmática, supra note 5, at 43
91. Jakobs, Norm, Person, Gesellschaft 105 (2d ed. 1999). This issue has been thoroughly developed in recent times.
92. See Jakobs, Normativización, supra note 32, at 52
93. Jakobs, Staatliche Strafe, supra note 5, at 5, 24, 31, 39.
94. Jakobs, Staatliche Strafe, supra note 5, at 29.
95. Put differently: "a penal sanction is contradiction and inflicting pain; and the measure of this pain is determined by what is needed by the norm infringed" (see Jakobs, Enemigo, supra note 5, at 69-70).
96. Jakobs, Staatliche Strafe, supra note 5, at 26.
97. Jakobs, Staatliche Strafe, supra note 5, 24-30.
98. Jakobs, Staatliche Strafe, supra note 5, at 28-29.
99. Jakobs, Enemigo, supra note 5, at 70.
100. Id.
101. For an in-depth analysis of the relationship between Jakobs's and Luhmann's theories see Carlos Gómez-Jara Díez, Teoría de sistemas y Derecho penal: Culpabilidad y pena en una teoria constructivista del Derecho penal, in Teoria de Sistemas y Derecho Penal 386 (Carlos Gómez-Jara Díez ed., 2005).
102. Regarding the independence of the consciousness autopoiesis and communication autopoiesis see Niklas Luhmann, Theories of Distinction: Redescribing the Descriptions of Modernity 169 (William Rasch ed., 2002) [hereinafter Luhmann, Theories, supra note 41];
103. Luhmann, 6 Soziologische Aufklarung at 12, 25, 37 (1995).
104. Nonetheless we must bear in mind that the revolutionary thesis of Niklas Luhmann was not to hold the self-referentiality of consciousness (see in neuropsychology Gerhard Roth, Gehirn und Selbstorganisation, in Selbstorganisation Aspekte Einer Wissenschaftlichen Revolution 167 (Wolfgang Krohn & Günter Küppers eds., 1990)
105. Gerhard Roth, Selbstorganisation - Selbsterhaltung - Selbstreferentialitẗ in: Selbstorganisation, Die Entstehung von Ordnung in Natur und Gesellschaft 149 (Andreas Dress et al. eds., 1986)) but that communication is also self-referential (see Niklas Luhmann, Theories at 155, stating that "only communication can communicate and that what we understand as 'action' can be generated only in such a network of communication";
106. Niklas Luhmann, 6 Soziologische Aufklärungat 113 (1995) [hereinafter Luhmann, Soziologische Aufklärung, supra note 41].
107. See also Klaus Merten, Kommunikation: Eine Begriffs- und Prozessanalyse (1977).
108. For profound analysis of law as an autopoietic social system, see Luhmann, Law, supra note 30
109. Niklas Luhmann, Law as a Social System, 83 NWULR 136
110. Gunther Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System (1993).
111. Famous phrase by the mathematician and cybernetician William R. Ashby, Introduction to Cybernetics at 4 (1956).
112. This means that the environment contains no information for the system: the environment is the way it is (see Heinz von Foerster, Observing Systems (1981)).
113. This does not imply that there is no mutual irritation between them. It actually takes places through structural couplings. Regarding the structural coupling between consciousness and communication see Niklas Luhmann, Theories, supra note 41, at 163
114. Luhmann, Die Wissenschaft Der Gesellschaft II (1990)
115. Luhmann, Soziologische Aufklärung, supra note 41, at 37
116. Dirk Baecker, Die Unterscheidung zwischen Kommunikation und Bewusstsein, in Emergenz: Die Entstehung von Ordnung, Organisation und Bedeutung 217 (1992).
117. Yet, the content of communication will never be determined by consciousness. To be sure, the concept of structural coupling implies that "none of them may contribute to the autopoietic operation of the other system. When we are using the concept of structural coupling to describe the relationship between conscious systems and communication system, we are assuring that those systems operate totally independent from each other" (Luhmann, Soziologische Aufklärung, supra note 41, at 32).
118. "It is quite obvious that both systems (psychological and social) cannot exist nor operate without the other. But it holds equally true for many other requirements: Life autopoiesis regarding physical and chemical conditions on which life depends" (see Luhmann, Soziologische Aufklärung, supra note 41, at 31).
119. The legal system's function is to secure normative expectations [see Luhmann, Law, supra note 30, at 142
120. "Expectation ... does not refer to an actual state of consciousness of a given individual human being but to the temporal aspect of the meaning of communication" (at 143).
121. Previous Jakobs statements, however, are not consistent with this thinking and basically refer to a minimum cognitive performance on the part of the individual to acknowledge the persona status. In case such a minimum is not performed by the individual, she will not be recognized as a person and enemy criminal law will come into play. Hence, enemy criminal law consists more in the normative reassurance of cognitive expectations, or to put it differently: It is sheer coercion and violence (see Jakobs, Enemigo, supra note 5, at 34).
122. In this sense Luhmann, Law, supra note 30, at 102, states that systems "presuppose a continuity of matter or energy in which the boundaries of the system do not appear." Clearly, the concept of structural coupling implies a certain irritation between systems; moreover, communication depends upon those consciousness irritations. But it does not imply that the content of consciousness may determine the content of communication.
123. Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, State, Society and Liberty 60 (1991): "The liberal secular State lives from presumptions which it cannot itself guarantee. As a free state it only exists as long as the freedom which it grants to its citizens is regulated from the inside, out of the moral substance of the individual and the homogeneity of society. On the other hand it cannot warrant these regulative forces by its own authority, with the instruments of law and authoritarian command, without abandoning the principle of freedom, thus relapsing into a secularized version of the totalitarian demands it successfully overcame in the course of the confessional wars."
124. See Niklas Luhmann, 4 Gesellschaftstruktur und Semantik 101 (1995). This evolution may be clearly tracked in Helmut Willke's impressive works: Willke, Entzauberung Des Staates (1983)
125. Willke, Ironiee Des Staates II (1992)
126. Willke, Supervision De Staates at 9, 271 (1998) (highlighting the influence of Knowledge Society (Wissensgesellschaft))
127. Willke, Atopia 14 (2001)
128. Willke, Heterotopia 10, 76 (2003) (indicating the Global Governance characteristics as the symbol of the new world order).
129. See above, section II.3.
130. If a distinction between a formal and a material personhood is adopted (see Jakobs, supra note 33, at 98) then the materialization does not take place because of being a person in the material sense, but because of remaining an individual in the formal sense (material humanity).
131. The offender goes to prison because all in all he is an individual. See similar criticism displayed by Jorn Hauschild, Die Positive Generalprävention und das Strafverfahren, at 140-41 (2000).
132. See Gómez-Jara Díez, supra note 40, at 402.
133. For the following reasoning see Niklas Luhmann, Essays on Self-Reference 21 (1990)
134. Luhmann, Macht 4 (1975)
135. Luhmann, Social Systems (1996)
136. Luhmann, Law, supra note 30, at 98
137. Luhmann, supra note 49, at 316, 332, 359, 393.
138. See also Udo Di Fabio, Offener Diskurs und Geschlossene Systeme at 150 (1991).
139. Luhmann, supra note 49, at 320-21.
140. Luhmann, supra note 49, at 321.
141. Following this reasoning, Wilfried Bottke, Assoziationspravention: Zur heutigen Diskussion der Strafzwecke at 63 (1995).
142. This position is not so far from such approaches as Peter Strawson, Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays (1974) and Andrew von Hirsch, Censure and Sanctions (1993).
143. The different perspectives from which to observe the legal system has been a recurring theme in legal theory. The legitimacy question is closely related to this debate. In order to access the contending arguments see Jürgen Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies In Political Theory (2000) and Niklas Luhmann's response in Luhmann, Quod Omnes Tangit: Remarks on Jurgen Habermas' Legal Theory, 17 Cardozo L. Rev. 830, 891 (1996).
144. Precisely here lies the reason why corporate criminal sanctions are feasible (see Carlos Gómez-Jara Díez, La Culpabilidad Penal de la Empresa 296 (2005).
145. This would explain the suppression of physical pain penalties and the enormous increase of monetary penalties. Regardless of the fact that such an evolution facilitates managing penalties in our society - and it also enriches the state - what seems extremely relevant is that the expressive meaning of penal sanctions remains, i.e., it has not changed though physical pain is no longer present as such. Expressive theories in the U.S. debate provide interesting insights for these matters (see Matthew Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1363 (2000)
146. Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1503 (2000)
147. in the criminal law battlefield see Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 591 (1996)
148. Kahan, Between Economics and Sociology: The New Path of Deterrence 95 Mich. L. Rev. 2477 (1997)
149. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 413 (1999).
150. See generally Carlos Gómez-Jara Díez, Die Strafe: Eine systemtheoretische Beobachtung, 36 Rechtstheorie 352 (2005).
151. Jakobs, Dogmática, supra note 5, at 46.
152. To put it in Cole's words: "citizens' rights have already suffered spill-over effects from measures targeted at foreign nationals" (Cole, Enemy Aliens: Double Standards, supra note 28, at 75).
153. Jakobs, Enemigo, supra note 5, at 50.
154. Jakobs, Enemigo, supra note 5, at 82.
155. Jakobs, Enemigo, supra note 5, at 48.
156. Jakobs, Enemigo, supra note 5, at 76.
157. Id.
158. Jakobs, Enemigo, supra note 5, at 34. (For an interesting discussion as to what is needed, from a constitutional perspective, see Michael S. Paulsen, supra note 19.)
159. See similarly Cancio Meliá, supra note 6, at 144-47.
160. Peter Alexis Albrecht, 117 ZStW 852 (2005).
161. See Cancio Meliá, supra note 6, at 129-43. Many authors agree with this position (see Ambos, supra note 9, at 138
162. Hörnle, supra note 8, at 69-70
163. Muñoz Conde, supra note 6, at 37
164. Demetrio Crespo, supra note 15, at 493).
165. Yet, to confront criticism see Polaino-Orts, supra note 6, at 213.
166. Jakobs, Enemigo, supra note 5, at 47.
167. Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA of 22 December 2003.
168. Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA of 19 July 2002.
169. Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003.
170. Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002.
171. This goes a step further than the fundamental reasoning of David Cole, Enemy Aliens: Double Standards, supra note 28, at 17-21, of trading foreign nationals' liberty for Americans' security: It is to trade enemies' liberty (whether American or foreign-national) for citizens' liberty (whether American or foreign-national).
172. To be sure, this is something that Cole, supra at 72-82, also takes incidentally into account, concluding that "citizens should be skeptical of claims that measures directed at foreign nationals will leave their rights secure." A development of this argument may be found in Cole, supra note 19.
173. See also Ackerman, Before the Next Attack, supra note 19, 35-38, speaking of the "enemy within."
174. Regarding the distinction between external and internal enemies, see Ambos, supra note 9, at 15.
175. See also Fletcher, supra note 1, stating that current enemy criminal law in America leaves certain individuals, e.g., convicted felons, "in a permanent state of second-class citizenship."
176. Jakobs, Enemigo, supra note 5, at 77.
177. See Ackerman, Before the Next Attack, supra note 19, 13.38, 39-57, arguing why it is neither a "war" nor a "crime" but an emergency.
178. See Cole, Enemy Aliens: Double Standards, supra note 28, at 1-21, 183-208 (2003)
179. Cole, Enemy Aliens, supra note 28.
180. See however, Cole, Enemy Aliens: Double Standards, supra note 28, 211-27, equating the Bill of Rights with the Human Rights ("the normative idea underlying this broad consensus is that fundamental rights are owed to persons as a matter of human dignity and should be honoured no matter what form of government a particular community chooses to adopt" at 215).
181. For a thorough review of the enemy combatant cases, see Robert J. Pushaw Jr., The "Enemy Combatant" Cases in Historical Context: The Inevitability of Pragmatic Judicial Review, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1005 (2007), concluding that "it would be premature to conclude that the four recent 'enemy combatant' decisions portend a permanent shift to heroic judicial defense of individual rights against government overreaching in waging war" (at 1016).
182. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
183. Neal Katyal & Laurence Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, III Yale L.J. 1259 (2002).
184. Though not referring to the term ("citizen") here employed see Cole, Enemy Aliens: Double Standards, supra note 28, 211-27.
185. See the detailed analysis of Ambos, supra note 9 (proposing a "criminal law fair to human kind" (menschengerechtes Strafrecht).
186. Jakobs, Enemigo, supra note 5, at 53.
187. See extensively Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Globalverfassung: Die Geltungsbegrundug Der Menschenrechte (2005)
188. Fischer-Lescano, Globalverfassung: Verfassung der Weltgesellschaft, 88 Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 349 (2002)
189. Fischer-Lescano, Globalverfassung: Los desaparecidos und das Paradox der Menschenrechte, 23 Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie 217 (2002).
190. Neal Katyal, Executive and Judicial Overreaction in Guantanamo Cases, 2004 Cato S. Ct. Rev. 49 (2003-04).
191. Neal Karyal, Sunsetting Judicial Opinions, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1237 (2004).