Cash-in-the-market pricing and optimal resolution of bank failures

Review of Financial Studies

Volumn 21, Issue 6, 2008, Pages 2705-2742

  Acharya, Viral V ^a,c   Yorulmazer, Tanju ^b  

^a CEPR   (United Kingdom)

^b FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK   (United States)

^c LONDON BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 57349187822     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: 14657368     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhm078     Document Type: Article

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