The Case against Epistemic Relativism: Reflections on Chapter 6 of Fear of Knowledge

Episteme

Volumn 4, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 10-29

  Rosen, Gideon ^a  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85010645004     PISSN: 17423600     EISSN: 17500117     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3366/epi.2007.4.1.10     Document Type: Article

References (12)

1. Boghossian Paul. 2005. “Relativism and Epistemic Norms.” Lecture, Princeton University, April 2005.
2. Boghossian Paul. 2006. Fear of Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
3. Broome John. 2001. “Are Intentions Reasons? And How Should We Cope with Incommensurable Values?” Pp. 98–120 in Practical Rationality and Preference: Essays for David Gauthier, ed. Morris Christopher and Ripstein Arthur. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
4. Cappelen Herman and Ernest Lepore. 2005. Insensitive Semantics. Oxford: Blackwell.
5. Foley Richard. 1987. A Theory of Epistemic Rationality. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
6. Gibbard Allan. 1990. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
7. Harman Gilbert. 1996. “Moral Relativism.” Pp. 1–64 in Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity, ed. Harman Gilbert and Thompson Judith. Oxford: Blackwell.
8. Harman Gilbert. 1999. “Pragmatism and Reasons for Belief.” Pp. 93–118 in Reasoning, Meaning and Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
9. Kaufmann Walter. 1958. Critique of Religion and Philosophy. New York: Harper.
10. Lewis David. 1983. “Scorekeeping in a Language Game.” Pp. 233–249 in Philosophical Papers. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
11. Raz Joseph. 2007. On Reasons and Rationality (ms).
12. Stanley Jason. 2000. “Context and Logical Form.” Linguistics and Philosophy 23: 391–434.