How to discount double-counting when it counts: Some clarifications

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Volumn 59, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 857-879

  Mayo, Deborah G ^a  

^a VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 57249090812     PISSN: 00070882     EISSN: 14643537     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axn034     Document Type: Article

References (16)

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