For whom the TEL tolls: Can state tax and expenditure limits effectively reduce spending?

State Politics and Policy Quarterly

Volumn 8, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 331-361

  Kousser, Thad ^a   McCubbins, Mathew D ^a   Moule, Ellen ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 57049117815     PISSN: 15324400     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/153244000800800401     Document Type: Article

References (76)

1. Abrams, Burton A., and William R. Dougan. 1986. "The Effects of Constitutional Restraints on Government Spending." Public Choice 49:101-16.
2. Alchian, Armen A., and Harold Demsetz. 1972. "Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization." American Economic Review 62:777-95.
3. Aldrich, John, and David W. Rohde. 1998. "Measuring Conditional Party Government." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 23-25, Chicago, IL.
4. Aldrich, John, and David W. Rohde. 2000. "The Consequences of Party Organization in the House: The Role of the Majority and Minority Parties in Conditional Party Government." In Polarized Politics: Congress and the President in a Partisan Era, eds. Jon Bond and Richard Fleisher. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
5. Bails, Dail. 1990. "The Effectiveness of Tax-Expenditure Limitations: A Re-evaluation." American Journal of Economics and Sociology 49:223-38.
6. Bails, Dail, and Margaret Tieslau. 2000. "The Impact of Fiscal Constitution on State and Local Expenditures." Cato Journal 20:255-77.
7. Bali, Valentina A. 2003. "Implementing Popular Initiatives: What Matters for Compliance?" The Journal of Politics 65:1130-46.
8. Bernheim, B. Douglas, and Michael Whinston. 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence." Quarterly Journal of Economics 101:1-31.
9. Bertrand, Marianne, Esther Duflo, and Sendhil Mullainathan. 2004. "How Much Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates?" Quarterly Journal of Economics 119:249-75.
10. Bowler, Shaun, Todd Donovan, and Caroline J. Tolbert. 1998. Citizens as Legislators: Direct Democracy in the United States. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press.
11. Brown, Fred. 2005. "Election's Winners and Losers." The Denver Post. 6 November, E-06.
12. Cain, Bruce E. and George A. Mackenzie. Forthcoming. "Are California's Fiscal Constraints Institutional or Political?" Public Policy Institute of California.
13. Clemente, Jesus, Antonio Montanes, and Marcelo Reyes. 1998. "Testing for a Unit Root in Variables with a Double Change in the Mean." Economics Letters 59:175-82.
14. Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1993. Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
15. Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2005. Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the US House of Representatives. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
16. Cox, James and David Lowery. 1990. "The Impact of the Tax Revolt Era State Fiscal Caps." Social Science Quarterly 3:492-509.
17. Elder, Harold W. 1992. "Exploring the Tax Revolt: An Analysis of the Effectiveness of State Tax and Expenditure Limitation Laws." Public Finance Quarterly 20:47-63.
18. Epstein, David, and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1999. Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
19. Fenno, Richard F. 1973. Congressmen in Committees. Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Co.
20. Frates, Chris. 2005. "Fiscal Folly?" State Legislatures January: 20-3.
21. Garrett, Elizabeth, and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2008. "When Voters Make Laws: How Direct Democracy is Shaping American Cities." Public Works Management & Policy.
22. Gerber, Elisabeth R. 1996. "Legislative Response to the Threat of Popular Initiatives." American Journal of Political Science 40:99-128.
23. Gerber, Elisabeth. 1998. "Pressuring Legislatures Through the Use of the Initiatives: Two Forms of Indirect Influence." In Citizens as Legislators: Direct Democracy in the United States, eds. Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan, and Caroline Tolbert. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press.
24. Gerber, Elisabeth. 1999. The Populist Paradox: Interest Group Influence and the Promise of Direct Legislation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
25. Gerber, Elisabeth R., and Arthur Lupia. 1995. "Campaign Competition and Policy Respon-siveness in Direct Legislation Elections." Political Behavior 17:287-306.
26. Gerber, Elisabeth R., Arthur Lupia, and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2004. "When Does Government Limit the Impact of Voter Initiatives? The Politics of Implementation and Enforcement. " The Journal of Politics 66:43-68.
27. Gerber, Elisabeth R., Arthur Lupia, Mathew D. McCubbins, and D. Roderick Kiewiet. 2001. Stealing the Initiative: How State Government Responds to Direct Democracy. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
28. Granger, C. W. J. 1969. "Investigating Causal Relations by Econometric Methods and Cross-Spectral Methods." Econometrica 34:424-38.
29. Grossman, Sanford J., and Oliver D. Hart. 1983. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem." Econometrica 51:7-45.
30. Halper, Evan. 2005. "Would State Budget Cap Pinch Like Colorado's?" The Los Angeles Times. 23 October, Al.
31. Holmstrom, Bengt. 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability." Bell Journal of Economics 10:74-91.
32. Howard, Marcia. 1989. "Tax and Expenditure Limitations: There Is No Story." Public Budgeting and Finance 9:83-90.
33. Huber, John D., and Charles R. Shipan. 2002. Deliberate Discretion? The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
34. Joyce, Philip G., and Daniel R. Mullins. 1991. "The Changing Fiscal Structure of the State and Local Public Sector: The Impact of Tax and Expenditure. Public Administration Review 51:240-53.
35. Kiewiet, D. Roderick, and Kristin Szakaly. 1996. "Constitutional Limitations on Borrowing: An Analysis of State Bonded Indebtedness." The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 12:62-97.
36. Kiewiet, D. Roderick, and Mathew D. McCubbins, 1991. The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
37. King-Meadows, Tyson, and David Lowery. 1996. "The Impact of the Tax Revolt Era State Fiscal Caps." Public Budgeting and Finance 16:102-12.
38. Kousser, Thad, Mathew D. McCubbins, and Kaj Rozga, 2007. "When Does the Ballot Box Limit the Budget? Politics and Spending Limits in California, Colorado, Utah, and Washington." In Fiscal Challenges: An Inter-Disciplinary Approach to Budget Policy, eds. Elizabeth Garrett, Elizabeth Graddy, and Howell Jackson. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
39. Krehbiel, Keith. 1991. Information and Legislative Organization. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
40. Lupia, Arthur, and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1998. The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know? New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
41. Lupia, Arthur, and John G. Matsusaka. 2004. "Direct Democracy: New Approaches to Old Questions." Annual Review of Political Science 7:463-82.
42. MacKinley, A. Craig. 1997. "Event Studies in Economics and Finance." Journal of Economic Literature 35:13-39.
43. Matsusaka, John. 1995. "Fiscal Effects of the Voter Initiative: Evidence from the Last 30 Years." Journal of Political Economy 103:587-623.
44. Matsusaka, John. 2000. "Fiscal Effects of the Voter Initiative in the First Half of the Twentieth Century." Journal of Law and Economics 43:619-50.
45. Matsusaka, John. 2004. For the Many or the Few. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
46. Matsusaka, John, and Nolan McCarty. 2001. "Political Resource Allocation: Benefits and Costs of Voter Initiatives." Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 17:413-48.
47. McCubbins, Mathew D., Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control." Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 3:243-77.
48. McCubbins, Mathew D., Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast. 1989. "Structure and Process as Solutions to the Politicians Principal-Agency Problem." Virginia Law Review 74:431-82.
49. McKelvey, Richard D., and Peter C. Ordeshook. 1984. "An Experimental Study of the Effects of Procedural Rules on Committee Behavior." The Journal of Politics 46:182-205.
50. Misiolek, Walter S., and Harold W. Elder. 1988. "Tax Structure and the Size of Government: An Empirical Analysis of the Fiscal Illusion and Fiscal Stress Arguments." Public Choice 57:233-47.
51. Moffitt, Robert. 1991. "Program Evaluation with Nonexperimental Data." Evaluation Review 15: 291-314.
52. Mullins, Daniel R. 2004. "Tax and Expenditure Limitations and the Fiscal Response of Local Government: Asymmetric Intra-local Fiscal Effects." Public Budgeting and Finance 24:111-47.
53. Mullins, Daniel R., and Philip G. Joyce. 1996. "Tax and Expenditure Limitations and State and Local Fiscal Structure: An Empirical Assessment." Public Budgeting and Finance 16:75-101.
54. Mullins, Daniel R., and Bruce A. Wallin. 2004. "Tax and Expenditure Limitations: Introduction and Overview." Public Budgeting and Finance 24:2-15.
55. National Conference of State Legislatures. 2005. State Tax and Spending Limits 2004, and Appendix. Provided to the authors via email, March 2005.
56. New, Michael J. 2001. Limiting Government through Direct Democracy: The Case of State Tax and Expenditure Limitations. Cato Policy Analysis #420. Washington, DC: The Cato Institute.
57. North, Douglass, and Barry Weingast. 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England." Journal of Economic History 49:803-32.
58. Perron, Pierre. 1989. "The Great Crash, the Oil Price Shock, and the Unit Root Hypothesis." Econometrica 57:1361-401.
59. Perron, Pierre, and Timothy J. Vogelsang. 1992. "Nonstationarity and Level Shifts with an Application to Purchasing Power Parity." Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 10:301-20.
60. Poterba, James M., and Kim S. Rueben. 1999. Fiscal Rules and State Borrowing Costs: Evidence from California and Other States. San Francisco, CA: Public Policy Institute of California.
61. Rohde, David. 1991. Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
62. Ross, Stephen A. 1973. "The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal Problem." American Economic Review 63:134-9.
63. Rueben, Kim S. 1997. Tax Limitations and Government Growth: The Effect of State Tax and Expenditure Limits on State and Local Government. PhD Diss. Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
64. Shadbegian, Ronald J. 1996. "Do Tax and Expenditure Limitations Affect the Size and Growth of State Government?" Contemporary Economic Policy 14:22-35.
65. Schick, Allen. 1995. The Federal Budget: Politics, Policy, Process. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
66. Schick, Allen. 2005. "Statement of Allen Schick Before the House Committee on the Budget." www.house.gov/budget/hearings/schickstmnt062205. pdf (June 25, 2005).
67. Shadbegian, Ronald J. 1998. "Do Tax and Expenditure Limitations Affect Local Government Budgets?" Public Finance Review 26:218-36.
68. Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Barry R. Weingast. 1984. "Legislative Politics and Budget Out-comes." In Federal Budget Policy in the 1980s, eds. Gregory B. Mills and John L. Palmer. Washington, DC: Urban Institute.
69. Sims, Christopher. 1972. "Money, Income, and Causality." American Economic Review 62:540-52.
70. Skidmore, Mark. 1999. "Tax and Expenditure Limitations and the Fiscal Relationships between State and Local Governments." Public Choice 99: 77-102.
71. Smith, Daniel A. 1998. Tax Crusaders and the Politics of Direct Democracy. New York, NY: Routledge.
72. Stansel, Dean. 1994. Taming Leviathan: Are Tax and Spending Limits the Answer? Cato Policy Analysis #213. Washington, DC: The Cato Institute.
73. U.S. Census Bureau, appropriate editions. State and Local Government Finance. Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau.
74. U.S. Census Bureau, appropriate editions. State Government Finance. Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau.
75. U.S. Census Bureau, appropriate editions. Statistical Abstract of the United States. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
76. Wooldridge, Jeffery M. 2002. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.