Assessing social costs of inefficient procurement design

Journal of the European Economic Association

Volumn 3, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 826-850

  Eklöf, Matias ^a  

^a UPPSALA UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 57049091450     PISSN: 15424766     EISSN: 15424774     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/1542476054430825     Document Type: Article

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