The cost of imperfect agency in health care: Evidence from rural Cameroun

Journal of Development Economics

Volumn 88, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 282-291

  Leonard, Kenneth L ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

Author keywords

Africa; Asymmetric information; Health care; Imperfect agency; Medical effort; Shirking

Indexed keywords

DATA SET; HEALTH EXPENDITURE; HEALTH SERVICES; HEALTH WORKER; MEDICAL GEOGRAPHY; RURAL SOCIETY; TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE; TRADITIONAL MEDICINE;

AFRICA; CAMEROON; SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA; WEST AFRICA;

EID: 56349114329     PISSN: 03043878     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2008.06.012     Document Type: Article

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