African traditional healers and outcome-contingent contracts in health care

Journal of Development Economics

Volumn 71, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 1-22

  Leonard, Kenneth L ^a  

^a Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

Author keywords

African health care; Asymmetric information; Outcome contingent contracts; Traditional healers; Traditional medicine

Indexed keywords

DISEASE TREATMENT; HEALTH CARE; HEALTH SERVICES; TRADITIONAL MEDICINE;

CAMEROON;

EID: 0038076020     PISSN: 03043878     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-3878(02)00131-1     Document Type: Article

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