Incentives, supervision, and sharecropper productivity

Journal of Development Economics

Volumn 88, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 232-241

  Jacoby, Hanan G ^a   Mansuri, Ghazala ^a  

^a WORLD BANK   (United States)

Author keywords

Contracts; Incentives; Sharecropping; Supervision

Indexed keywords

AGRICULTURAL FINANCE; INCENTIVE; LAND TENURE; RURAL AREA; RURAL FINANCE; SHARECROPPING;

ASIA; EURASIA; PAKISTAN; SOUTH ASIA;

EID: 56349094220     PISSN: 03043878     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2008.07.001     Document Type: Article

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