Inductive game theory: A basic scenario

Journal of Mathematical Economics

Volumn 44, Issue 12, 2008, Pages 1332-1363

  Kaneko, Mamoru ^a   Kline, J Jude ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TSUKUBA   (Japan)

^b BOND UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

Experience; Experiential foundation; Extensive game; Induction; Information piece; Memory function; Nash equilibrium

Indexed keywords

EID: 55949098920     PISSN: 03044068     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.07.009     Document Type: Article

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