Economic choice, political decision, and the problem of limits

Public Choice

Volumn 137, Issue 3-4, 2008, Pages 507-522

  Munger, Michael C ^a  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Market processes; Political economy; Politics; Risk

Indexed keywords

EID: 54949157275     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-008-9353-3     Document Type: Review

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