The Überlingen accident: Macro-level safety lessons

Safety Science

Volumn 46, Issue 10, 2008, Pages 1483-1508

  Brooker, Peter ^a  

^a CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Air traffic management; Collision risk; Formal safety assessment; Risk analysis

Indexed keywords

ACCIDENTS; AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS; PUBLIC POLICY; RISK ANALYSIS; RISK ASSESSMENT; RISK PERCEPTION; SAFETY FACTOR;

ACCIDENT CAUSATIONS; ACCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS; AIR COLLISIONS; AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT; AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENTS; COLLISION RISK; EUROCONTROL; FORMAL SAFETY ASSESSMENT; POLICY ISSUES; RESEARCH STUDIES; RISK ESTIMATIONS; SAFETY ISSUES; TWO SECTIONS;

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL;

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT; ARTICLE; POLICY; PRIORITY JOURNAL; RISK ASSESSMENT; TECHNOLOGY; TRAFFIC SAFETY;

EID: 54949125359     PISSN: 09257535     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ssci.2007.10.001     Document Type: Article

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