Coalition government and political communication

Political Research Quarterly

Volumn 61, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 502-516

  Martin, Lanny W ^a   Vanberg, Georg ^b  

^a RICE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA   (United States)

Author keywords

Coalitions; Debates; Legislatures

Indexed keywords

EID: 54349109922     PISSN: 10659129     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1065912907308348     Document Type: Review

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