Intuitive and noncompetitive equilibria in weakly efficient auctions with entry costs

Mathematical social sciences

Volumn 56, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 448-455

  Miralles, Antonio ^a  

^a USA   (United States)

Author keywords

Auctions; Efficiency; Entry costs; Intuitive equilibria; Revenue

Indexed keywords

EID: 54049140861     PISSN: 01654896     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.06.004     Document Type: Article

References (7)

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