Do farmers value the environment? Evidence from a conservation reserve program auction

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 26, Issue 6, 2008, Pages 1323-1332

  Vukina, Tomislav ^a   Zheng, Xiaoyong ^a   Marra, Michele ^a   Levy, Armando ^b  

^a NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b THE BRATTLE GROUP   (United States)

Author keywords

Decision theory; Environmental benefits evaluation; Government auctions

Indexed keywords

COMMERCE; GEOLOGIC MODELS;

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIONS; CONSERVATION RESERVE PROGRAM; DECISION THEORETIC APPROACHES; DECISION THEORY; ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS; ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS EVALUATION; FARMERS' ATTITUDES; GOVERNMENT AUCTIONS; SOIL PRODUCTIVITY;

AGRICULTURE;

EID: 53249138156     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2008.01.001     Document Type: Article

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