Coordination and turnout in large elections

Mathematical and Computer Modelling

Volumn 48, Issue 9-10, 2008, Pages 1478-1496

  Diermeier, Daniel ^a   Van Mieghem, Jan A ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Behavioral economics; Bounded rationality; Collective action; Elections; Game theory; Learning; Markov processes; On line polls; Voting

Indexed keywords

FEEDBACK; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; STATE FEEDBACK; SURVEYS;

BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS; BOUNDED RATIONALITY; COLLECTIVE ACTION; CURRENT STATE; ELECTIONS; EMPIRICAL REGULARITIES; EXPECTED UTILITY; GAME THEORY; LEARNING; LIMITING DISTRIBUTIONS; MARKOV PROCESSES; NON-MONOTONIC; ON-LINE POLLS; OPINION POLLS; POLITICAL SCIENCE; VOTING;

STOCHASTIC MODELS;

EID: 52949125210     PISSN: 08957177     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.mcm.2008.05.042     Document Type: Article

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