Voting with your pocketbook - a stochastic model of consumer boycotts

Mathematical and Computer Modelling

Volumn 48, Issue 9-10, 2008, Pages 1497-1509

  Diermeier, Daniel ^a   Van Mieghem, Jan A ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Behavioral economics; Bounded rationality; Collective action; Game theory; Learning; Markov processes; Public goods

Indexed keywords

GAME THEORY; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; SOLUTIONS; STANDARDS; STOCHASTIC PROGRAMMING;

BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS; BOUNDED RATIONALITY; COLLECTIVE ACTION; LEARNING; LIMITING DISTRIBUTIONS; MARKOV PROCESSES; PUBLIC GOODS; STOCHASTIC PROCESSING;

STOCHASTIC MODELS;

EID: 52949105331     PISSN: 08957177     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.mcm.2008.05.043     Document Type: Article

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