Libertarianism, action theory, and the loci of responsibility

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 98, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 153-174

  Clarke, R ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 52849131571     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1018669215837     Document Type: Article

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