Commonsense morality and not being required to maximize the overall good

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 100, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 193-213

  Portmore, Douglas W ^a  

^a Department of Teacher Education and Department of Sociology and Anthropology   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 52849099937     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1018693319659     Document Type: Article

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